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I. INTRODUCTION
As conflicts between economic activity and environmental
protection have grown more frequent and more intense in recent
years, natural resource protection laws have come to play an
increasingly important role in American environmental policy.'
The preservation of unique ecosystems2 and biological diversity3
1. Many of these laws relate specifically to management of natural resources on
public lands. See, e.g., Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1988 & Supp. 1991);
Federal Lands Policy Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988 & Supp. 1991);
National Forest Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). Others impose constraints primarily on federal
governmental activities. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988
& Supp. 1991); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370b (1988 & Supp.
1991).
2. The ecosystem is the basic functional unit in the study of ecology. "Any unit that
includes all of the organisms ... in a given area interacting with the physical environment
so that a flow of energy leads to clearly defined trophic structure, biotic diversity, and
material cycles ... within the system is an ecological system or ecosystem." EUGENE P.
ODUM, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOLOGY 8 (1971) (emphasis in the original).
3. Biological diversity has been defined as "the variety and variability among living
organisms and the ecological complexes in which they occur." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGIES TO MAINTAIN BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 3 (1987).
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has gained recognition as an important national priority.4 While
public awareness of the alarming loss of forests, wetlands, desert
and grasslands, including the species that live in them, has moti-
vated efforts to protect these natural areas, these efforts have
repeatedly come into conflict with economic activity.
This Article is a case study of a single controversy that has
been raging in the Pacific Northwest: the now infamous dispute
over logging in publicly owned old-growth forests and the atten-
dant threat to the northern spotted owl. The spotted owl, confront-
ing extinction, sits at the center of the controversy, but the debate
extends far beyond the fate of the owl, raising issues about the
intrinsic value of unique and native ecosystems and the long-term
consequences of logging practices on our public lands on the one
hand, and about the costs of environmental protection and eco-
nomic transition on the other.
The old-growth controversy is destined to leave its mark on
our resource protection laws. Although litigation enforcing the
mandates of the Endangered Species Act and other statutes has
shaped a temporary resolution to the conflict, a full solution re-
mains to be found.5 Powerful voices among timber-dependent com-
munities in the Pacific Northwest have called for measures to
weaken or bypass the protections granted by preservation laws.
The history of the controversy, they assert, confirms that we have
a "spotted owl problem."
This Article takes seriously but ultimately rejects both the
claim that we have a spotted owl problem and the associated
efforts to weaken or bypass existing laws. The perception that the
spotted owl and the Endangered Species Act are our problems is
an understandable reaction to the current crisis. But a close ex-
amination of the controversy reveals that the owl and actions taken
4. See EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE (1992); BIODIVERSITY (Edward
0. Wilson ed., 1988) [hereinafter BIODIVERSITY]; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
supra note 3; Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological
Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265 (1991); Katherine S. Yagerman, Protecting Critical Habitat
Under the Federal Endangered Species Act, 20 ENVTL. L. 811, 818-22 (1990); see also
Robert B. Keiter, Taking Account of the Ecosystem on the Public Domain: Law and
Ecology in the Greater Yellowstone Region, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 923, 925 (1989).
5. On April 2, 1993, President Clinton and Vice President Gore attended a highly
publicized conference in Portland, designed to begin the process of finding such a solution.
See Timothy Egan, Clinton Under Crossfire at Logging Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,
1993, at A6.
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pursuant to the ESA are symptoms more than causes of the
problem.
Part II presents the ecological and social dimensions of the
conflict surrounding old-growth forest and the spotted owl. Part
III describes the legal and political history of the dispute and offers
several observations on the role that natural resource laws have
played, and how the laws themselves have been affected by this
controversy. Part IV reveals the fallacy of claims that the owl and
the ESA are our problems. It demonstrates that the ESA per-
formed its intended role in protecting the owl's habitat. The in-
adequacies in other laws governing public forest management are
deeper sources of the acute problems we faced in achieving the
valid goal of species preservation. These made the inevitable task
of reconciling economic and ecological demands unnecessarily dif-
ficult and costly. The Article concludes in Part V with suggestions
for improving our laws to avoid similar future battles, including
legislation protecting ecosystems or biodiversity, strengthening
and clarifying NEPA and public forest management laws, and
congressional responses to short-term economic hardship caused
by resource protection.
/
II. THE OLD-GROWTH AND SPOTTED OWL CONTROVERSY:
ECOLOGICAL AND5 SOCIAL DIMENSIONS
A. The Ecology of Old-Growth Forests
There is no single commonly accepted definition of "old-
growth" or "ancient" forest.6 At a minimum, such a forest includes
an area of mature conifers, with some fallen logs, and some stand-
ing dead trees ("snags"), capable of providing habitat and biomass,
and of performing the natural functions required to support this
unique ecosystem. 7
6. See ELLIOT A. NORSE, ANCIENT FORESTS OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 22 (1990).
7. See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, CRITICAL HABITAT FOR THE NORTHERN
SPOTTED OWL 66-70 (1992) [hereinafter CRITICAL HABITAT FOR THE NORTHERN SPOTTED
OWL] (describing functions and benefits of old-growth ecosystems). See also NORSE, supra
note 6, Table 3.2 (listing Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management Interim Defini-
tions for Westside Old Growth).
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The old-growth forests of the Pacific Northwest are charac-
terized by conifers that often attain 500 years of age and can have
a lifespan of 1200 years.8 Old-growth Douglas firs, which dominate
some of the forests, are profitably cut as a source of framing lumber
and plywood.9 Other species, including western red cedars, west-
ern hemlocks, and Sitka spruce, are also found in old-growth
forests.10
Many have long recognized the esthetic, recreational, and
spiritual value of these forests' majestic natural environment," but
only recently have scientists studied the ecological value of old-
growth forests.12 Now scientists widely recognize old-growth
stands as unique ecosystems, noted for the rich soil they generate,
the protection they provide from erosion, the still unidentified
genetic diversity of valuable species found in these forests, and
the flood prevention and water cleansing they provide. 13 Recent
8. NORSE, supra note 6, at 21.
9. Id. at 22.
10. Id.
11. See NORSE, supra note 6, at 8; see also ROBERT P. HARRISON, FORESTS, THE
SHADOW OF CIVILIZATION (1992) (surveying cultural importance of forests to Western
society); Victor M. Sher & Andy Stahl, Spotted Owls, Ancient Forests, Courts and Con-
gress: An Overview of Citizens' Efforts to Protect Old Growth and the Species that Live
in Them, 6 N.W. ENVTL. J. 361, 362 (1990). Such values have been recognized eloquently
in agency planning from time to time. See, e.g., CRITICAL HABITAT FOR THE NORTHERN
SPOTTED OWL, supra note 7, at B-16 (describing esthetic benefits of critical habitat pre-
servation as part of analysis of economic impacts); FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE, ANN. REP. OF THE CHIEF 2 (1927) (quoted in CHARLES F. WILKINSON
& H. MICHAEL ANDERSON, LAND AND RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS
338 n.1820 (1987)) (Annual Report of Forest Service Chief Greeley); WILKINSON & AN-
DERSON, supra, at 319 n.1706 (citing writings of Robert Marshall, co-founder of the Wil-
derness Society).
12. NORSE, supra note 6, at 8; Sher & Stahl, supra note 11, at 362. In the late 1960s,
two groups of scientists, one led by Eric Forsman, a graduate student studying raptor
biology at Oregon State University, and another led by Dr. Jerry Franklin, a Forest Service
scientist in the region, began studying old-growth ecology. Sher & Stahl, supra note 11, at
363. Forsman studied the spotted owl on the advice of Dr. Howard Wight. His resulting
thesis and dissertation confirmed Wight's speculation that the owl might be a species that
existed primarily in old-growth forests, a situation not previously contemplated by others.
Id. Franklin's research, on the other hand, led to the first formal characterization of old-
growth forests as distinctive ecosystems. Id.
13. See CRITICAL HABITAT FOR THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL, supra note 7, at
66-67, app. C; NORSE, supra note 6, at 8-9; Gary D. Meyers, Old-Growth Forests, the
Owl, and Yew: Environmental Ethics Versus Traditional Dispute Resolution Under the
Endangered Species Act and Other Public Lands and Resources Laws, 18 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 623, 632-33 (1991). A frequently cited example of the benefit of the genetic
information found in nature is the Pacific yew, whose bark can produce the drug taxol,
now being used successfully to treat ovarian cancer. See id. at 624; Sallie Tisdale, Save a
Life, Kill a Tree?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1991, at A19.
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research suggests that the diversity of plant species found in old-
growth forests may not be duplicated even in second-growth
forests14 100 years old. 15
Although there are no precise figures, estimates suggest that
between sixty and ninety percent of the old-growth forest in the
Pacific Northwest has been cut down. 16 The foundations of the
old-growth crisis were laid after World War II, when demand for
public timber skyrocketed. 17 During the post-war boom, private
landowners exhausted their old growth through excessive log-
ging.' 8 The federal government dramatically increased timber sales
from national forests to fill the gap. 19 By 1966, annual timber
production from national forests reached an all-time high of 12.1
billion board feet ("bbf"),20 up from an annual average of one bbf
before World War 11.21 Foreign demand for high-quality timber
from old growth further encouraged rapid depletion of American
forests,22 as did the pressure of heavy debt incurred by some
timber companies during the frantic leveraged buyouts of the
1980s. 23 Some predict that thirty or fewer years of continued har-
14. Second-growth forest is what regenerates in an area after the original old growth
is cleared.
15. See Catherine Dold, Study Casts Doubt on Belief in Self-Revival of Cleared
Forests, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1992, at C4.
16. See NORSE, supra note 6, at 6; INTERAGENCY SCIENTIFIC COMMITrEE TO AD-
DRESS THE CONSERVATION OF THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL, A CONSERVATION STRAT-
EGY FOR THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL 20 (May 1990) [hereinafter ISC REPORT]; Kathie
Durbin & Paul Koberstein, Forests in Distress, in Special Report, Northwest Forests: Day
ofReckoning, THE OREGONIAN, Oct. 15, 1990, at 24 [hereinafter Special Report, Northwest
Forests] (estimating that 12-15% of old growth remains, and reporting Forest Service data
suggesting there are 4 million acres of old growth on its land west of the Cascades, but
that study by Wilderness Society concludes only 2.3 million acres remain); Ted Gup, Owl
v. Man, TIME, June 25, 1990, at 59.
17. ISC REPORT, supra note 16, at 20. A recent report by the staff of the House of
Representatives Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, chaired by Representative
George Miller, reports U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service figures suggesting that 57% of the
native old-growth forests on Forest Service lands in Oregon and Washington have been cut
since 1955. See STAFF OF THE COMMITrEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL TIMBER RESOURCES: TH4E Loss
OF ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (June 15, 1992) [hereinafter MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL TIMBER
RESOURCES].
18. NORSE, supra note 6, at 22.
19. Timber sale receipts tripled from 1946 to 1950 and again from 1950 to 1956.
WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 137.
20. Id. at 138. A board foot represents a piece of timber 12 inches square and one
inch thick. Id. at 123 n.645.
21. Id. at 135.
22. Paul Koberstein, Private Forests Face Critical Shortages, in Special Report,
Northwest Forests, supra note 16, at 3 (discussing Asian buyers of old-growth timber).
23. See Kathie Durbin, Redwood Summer: Taking the Initiative, in Special Report,
Northwest Forests, supra note 16, at 4.
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vesting at recent levels would deplete all of the remaining old
growth in western Washington and Oregon. 24
Recently, the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") and the
Forest Service have sold more than 70,000 acres of trees, or
5 billion board feet, each year to be cut by private logging inter-
ests. 25 During the last ten years Congress has repeatedly imposed
higher cut rates on the agencies managing these forests than the
agencies have felt appropriate. 26 Although the economics of these
sales are not always simple, 27 the federal government loses money
each year from the logging operations in many of our national
forests .28
The lure of the profits for the industry, the counties,29 and the
agencies involved 0 has led to decades of logging at unsustainable
levels, 31 neglected reforestry efforts, 32 waning owl habitat, and the
possibility of other old-growth-dependent species facing
extinction.33
24. NORSE, supra -note 6, at 7-8.
25. Gup, supra note 16, at 59. About 85% of the remaining old growth in the western
Pacific Northwest is managed by either BLM or the Forest Service. Sher & Stahl, supra
note 11, at 362.
26. See WILLIAM DIETRICH, THE FINAL FOREST: THE BATTLE FOR THE LAST GREAT
TREES OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 176 (1992); Kathie Durbin, Rangers Scramble to Meet
Timber Quotas, in Special Report, Northwest Forests, supra note 16, at 7.
27. See generally RANDALL O'ToOLE, REFORMING THE FOREST SERVICE (1988)
(providing critical review of economic forces driving Forest Service decisions). See also
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Forest Service: A Call for a Return to First Principles, 5 PUB.
LAND L. REV. 1, 20-25 (1984).
28. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 117-18; see also O'ToOLE,
supra note 27, at 28-34. However, the old-growth Douglas fir forests of the Pacific North-
west account for a significant portion of the forests in which Forest Service revenues are
higher than management costs.
29. Counties in forest regions have profited from the liquidation of the national
forests, recovering 25% to 50% of the timber sale fees collected by the federal government.
See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 117-18; 43 U.S.C. § 1181f(a). Counties
such as Douglas County in Oregon stand to lose an estimated $13 million a year from
timber revenues if old-growth logging is ended. Gup, supra note 16, at 60. The profitable
arrangement with the federal agencies has allowed Oregon to avoid imposing a sales tax.
30. O'Toole believes the direct link between Forest Service budget levels and timber
sales volume is a critical factor in the current pattern of timber harvest. O'ToOLE, supra
note 27, at 139-71. See also DIETRICH, supra note 26, at 168, 174-75.
31. For a partial history of the unsustainable cutting of forests on public lands, see
DIETRICH, supra note 26, at 168-77; see also WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 11, at
125-28, 184-86; Gup, supra note 16, at 58 (remarks of Forest Service Research scientist
Jerry Franklin).
32. See generally MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL TIMBER RESOURCES, supra note 17,
at 2 (citing analysis of Forest Service statistics finding current forest regrowth rate of 64%);
Gup, supra note 16, at 56-58; Ted Gup, Artist with a 20-Lb. Saw, TIME, June 25, 1990,
at 61.
33. According to David Marshall, a former Fish and Wildlife Service wildlife biolo-
1993]
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The northern spotted owl, Strix occidentalis caurina, is at the
symbolic center of the old-growth controversy. Individual owls are
roughly twenty-two inches in height 34 and are dark brown with
white spots and mottling.35 Old-growth forest is the primary source
of suitable owl habitat.3 6 The home range for a single nesting pair
of owls is 3000 to 5000 acres, although the owls may require
considerably larger areas if the acreage includes sites that have
been heavily logged or where the old growth within the range is
fragmented. 37
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, scientists increasingly rec-
ognized that the owl might be an indicator species for the general
health of the old-growth forests. 38 Thus, the debate over the owl
has always been interconnected with the debate about preserving
old-growth forests. a9
gist, other species that face threats include the flammulated owl, white-headed woodpecker,
three-toed woodpecker, fisher, and marten. Kathie Durbin & Paul Koberstein, Survival
Hinges on Old-Growth Habitat, in Special Report, Northwest Forests, supra note 16, at 17.
34. See Gup, supra note 16, at 67.
35. ISC REPORT, supra note 16, at 9.
36. While the age of the forest is not critical, the structural characteristics necessary
for the species tend to be found in old-growth forests more often than in younger ones.
These features include:
large, tall, live trees with cavities, broken tops, dwarfmistletoe or platforms of
branches capable of holding organic matter suitable for use as a nest, dead
standing trees and fallen, decaying trees and limbs to support abundant pop-
ulations of prey species, especially northern flying squirrels and woodrats;
dominant trees in the stand with relatively large diameters; and multilayered
tree canopies with a moderate to high canopy closure in overstory, midstory,
and understory.
Id. at 62.
37. Id. at 197. The median acreage of old growth found within a pair's home range
in various studies has ranged from 615 to 2484 acres. Id. The owl also needs dispersal
areas, which permit juvenile owls to move from their natal area to a breeding site. Id. at
303. For the owl to survive, not only must there exist a minimum amount of suitable old-
growth acreage within home ranges, but the distribution of that acreage must account for
dispersal needs through corridors, connecting zones, or management of the landscape
between habitat areas. Id. at 304.
38. An indicator species is one whose threatened status is thought to signal the
general decline of the ecosystem in which it lives. The decline of an indicator species also
warns that the ecosystem likely contains other threatened or endangered species. See
NORMAN MYERS, THE SINKING ARK 50-51 (1979).
39. "Why all the fuss about the status and welfare of this particular bird? The
numbers, distribution, and welfare of spotted owls are widely believed to be inextricably
tied to mature and old-growth forests." ISC REPORT, supra note 16, at 7. As Jack Ward
Thomas, chair of the committee that authored the ISC Report noted, "[t]his issue was
never just about a bird .... The owl was a surrogate." DIETRICH, supra note 26, at 231.
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Scientists estimate that a total of only 3000 to 4000 owl pairs
remains, 40 and the population continues to decline. 41 The Intera-
gency Scientific Committee Report analyzing the owl's status in
1990 concluded that "the persistence of the owl is imperiled in
significant portions of its range by continued loss and concomitant
fragmentation of its habitat. '42
B. The Conflict in Values
Although the debate about old-growth forests is often coyly
characterized as "owl v. man," the controversy has broad ethical,
economic, spiritual, and esthetic implications. Only a deeper con-
cern with preservation of the forests has provided the fight to save
the owl with sufficient support to attain some success. The con-
troversy is not about owls alone or jobs alone, but about competing
priorities and values.43
Depending on whom one asks, the economic issues involved
can be framed quite differently. To timber interests, forest preser-
vation for spotted owl habitat threatens to reduce short-term prof-
its, interrupt commerce, and cause economic loss.44 They argue
that rising timber prices and widespread job loss will harm the
American public as a whole. At the very least, the owl's preser-
vation will require adjustment by industry, which necessarily in-
volves short-term costs. 45
For many who depend on the timber industry for their liveli-
hoods, preserving the forest has little or no value when compared
with their personal needs, or their view of society's needs. 46 "We
40. See ISC REPORT, supra note 16, at 2, 64-65.
41. Id. at 2.
42. Id. at 23.
43. See generally DIETRICH, supra note 26 (focusing on this tangle of values and
presenting stories of a wide range of people involved in and affected by dispute).
44. Since January 1989, 48 timber mills have closed in Oregon, Washington, and
Idaho and some 5500 workers have lost their jobs. Durbin & Koberstein, supra note 16,
at i.
45. See Jessica Mathews, It's Not 'Jobs vs. the Earth', WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 1992,
at C7.
46. In general, the decisions to boost harvest levels have served those with vested
economic interests in the timber of the region: logging companies and mills, their employees,
and those whose income depends on the prosperity of loggers. For a discussion of the
dynamic roles played by these local interests and broader national interests, see infra notes
272-279 (discussing public choice theory). People who have worked in the logging industry
19931
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survived without the dinosaur. What's the big deal about the owl?"
asked one car salesman in a town dependent on logging.4 7 Some
of the most zealous timber advocates speak of old growth as
"overripe," "wasteful," and "inefficient. '48 For many, timber is
nothing but a crop, 49 and owls are nothing but hated symbols to
be killed or hung in effigy.50 For these people, preservation seems
to place their jobs, community, and entire way of life at risk.5'
Most people who live in timber-dependent communities are
employees of a mill or timber company, and their relationship to
the land is necessarily contingent and commodified. Their jobs
permit them to live and work in the forests, but their connection
to the forest depends upon the wage that a corporation is willing
to pay them. With little or no control over the practices that have
impact on the forests, these employees simply carry out the orders
of enterprises driven often by short-term profit incentives and
world markets. Rather than benign forces of an invisible hand5 2
these incentives are sometimes tempered by perverse and ineffi-
cient investment motivations 53 and are the product of a history of
government subsidies for logging.
for their entire lives or for generations are often aware of the problems with ongoing
logging. See, e.g.; DIETRICH, supra note 26, at 203 (quoting Anne Goos, Republican
candidate for the Twenty-fourth Congressional District in Washington state). But they still
may believe that they should not suffer for industry and government short-sightedness, a
view shared by some who would preserve the forest and the owl.
47. Gup, supra note 16, at 60. For an exposition of a philosophy favoring limited
concern about species extinction because of the compensating contributions brought about
by human consciousness and endeavor, see Thomas Palmer, The Case for Human Beings,
ATL. MONTHLY, Jan. 1992, at 83; see also Charles C. Mann & Mark L. Plummer, The
Butterfly Problem, ATL. MONTHLY, Jan. 1992, at 48.
48. Gup, supra note 16, at 61 (remarks of Rod Greene, logging manager of SunStuds
Inc.).
49. Gup, supra note 16, at 61-62.
50. See Endangered Owl Nailed to Park Sign, CHI. TaIB., Jan. 17, 1991, at 11; Gup,
supra note 16, at 60; DIETRICH, supra note 26, at 262.
51. The logging tradition has deep roots in the forest of the Pacific Northwest. It is
one of a dwindling number of jobs that enable people to make an income from the land
and to be outdoors. See Gup, supra note 16, at 61; see generally DIETRICH, supra note 26
(presenting accounts of numerous people who work in Northwest logging industry). Dietrich
describes one logger and his family, the Tuttles, who live off the land and attempt to make
sure their use of the land is sustainable. Tuttle says of his connection to the land and his
lifestyle: "It's not necessarily a way of life, so much-it's a place of life. These are roots
that most people never get to know. If we sold it, we'd be rich on paper. But the truth is,
we'd be poor. How could I come back here and know someone else had it?" Id. at 279.
52. See Richard B. Norgaard, The Rise of the Global Exchange Economy and the
Loss of Biological Diversity, in BIODIVERSlTY, supra note 4, at 206-11.
53. See Mathews, supra note 45.
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To those who favor greater preservation of the forests, the
economic, ethical, and esthetic issues add up quite differently.
From this perspective, the economics of old-growth logging seem
like a bonanza for the few at the expense of the many. Although
few favor the possibility of work loss for timber industry employ-
ees, this group sees the controversy not as "owls v. people," but
as "jobs and quick profits now v. long-term jobs and profit." 54
Even accepting that jobs will be lost, many favor both preservation
of the owl and expenditures to lessen the hardship on those
affected.
Moreover, many refuse to view the loss of 30,000 timber
industry jobs55 as a crisis when the timber companies have fired
at least that many workers over the past five years as a result of
increased automation. 6 Some estimates predict that in the next
fifteen years technological changes will displace approximately
thirteen percent of the timber workforce.5 7 If the timber industry
can make these choices unhampered by public policy, why should
similar consequences arising out of the preservation of public re-
sources be decried?58
54. See William K. Stevens, Economists Strive to Find Environment's Bottom Line,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1992, at Cl, C8.
55. Estimates of the numbers of jobs at stake vary widely, from under 10,000, T.H.
Watkins, Dialogue: Showdown on Endangered Species; The Peggy Syndrome, N.Y. TIMES,
May 11, 1992, at A15, to 100,000, see, e.g., Bill Dietrich, Profusion of Agencies, Suits
Surround the Owl, SEATTLE TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1991, at B2. See also Scott Thurm & Bert
Robinson, At War over "The Law of Last Resort," CHI. TRIB., May 11, 1992, at 8 (reporting
logging industry estimate of 140,000 jobs and American Forestry Association estimate of
20,000 to 34,000 over next 10 years). Most estimates fall in the range of 20,000 to 40,000.
56. The significant impact of the export of raw logs and of corporate decisions to
move log-processing operations to the South are also noted. See Watkins, supra note 55;
see also John Head, Owl Decision Part of Scam, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 18, 1992, at
A12 (commenting on Louisiana-Pacific's new processing plant in Mexico to which it sends
California redwoods); Dori J. Yang, High-Tech Heaven, BUSINESS WEEK, May 25, 1992,
at 50 (discussing emerging role of high technology in region's economy).
57. Gup, supra note 16, at 61. One report suggested that although timber output rose
by 16% in the 1980s, employment in Oregon's logging industry fell by the same percentage
due to automation. Brad Knickerbocker, Split Decision on Owl is Inconclusive, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, May 18, 1992, at 8; see also Watkins, supra note 55 (estimating that the
owl will cause the loss of only 9000 jobs over several years compared with 26,000 lost due
to computerization, exports, and flight to the South).
58. See Richard J. Cattani, The Parade of Champions, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Nov. 13, 1991, at 23 (comparing IBM's plan to reduce its workforce by 20,000 jobs with
20,000jobs at stake in the old-growth controversy). Cf. Steve Lohr, IBM Posts $5.46 Billion
Loss for 4th Quarter, 1992's Deficit is Biggest in U.S. Business, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1993,
at CI (noting 1992 job cuts totalling 42,900 and projected cuts of 25,000 in 1993); Steve
Lohr, Job Cuts by IBM May Rise, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1993, at Cl (reporting that IBM
has reduced workforce from 407,000 in 1986 to 300,000 at end of 1992).
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With or without the preservation of the owl, the fact remains
that old-growth-dependent jobs will vanish as the last remaining
forests are logged. 59 The problems of economic dislocation and
regional transition are inevitable; we can face them now and save
the owl and the old growth, or face them later, after both are
extinguished. 60 The real question is which values should dictate
our next step on an inevitably rocky course: the short-term, locally
oriented approach that led to this ecological crisis, or a more
broadly focused, longer-term view?
From an ethical or esthetic perspective, many see the forest
and all that it embodies as having incommensurable worth. A small
but growing number of people are inclined to reject an exclusively
anthropocentric ethic that places people and their needs above
other life forms. 61 To those who favor biocentrism, America's
relationship to its public forests is founded on a utilitarian philos-
ophy that accords human needs and desires undue primacy. 62 A
biocentric ethic demands that we radically rethink our priorities
to accord greater respect not only to the owl but to all the forest's
life forms.
One need not go quite this far, however, to oppose harvesting
the remaining old growth and extinguishing the owl. Americans
value preventing extinction for a variety of reasons, ranging from
compassion to spiritual, religious, and ethical concerns. 63 People
59. See Mathews, supra note 45; Thurm & Robinson, supra note 55 (American
Forestry Association study concluding jobs in region would decline with or without pro-
tection of owl).
60. See Durbin & Koberstein, supra note 16, at 1, 24.
61. See, e.g., BILL DEVALL & GEORGE SESSIONS, DEEP ECOLOGY (1985); Laurence
H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental
Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974).
62. The utilitarian philosophy associated with Gifford Pinchot's vision of our national
forests played and continues to play a role in our relationship to public forests in particular.
See generally WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 11, for a history of American forest
planning law that highlights the role and evolution of Pinchot's philosophy in national forest
management.
63. An April 1991 Gallup poll revealed that 80% of those polled were worried about
the loss of natural habitat for wildlife. Fifty-three percent said they were worried a great
deal, and 27% worried a fair amount. See Graham Hueber, Americans Report High Levels
of Environmental Concern, Activity, 55 THE GALLUP POLL NEWS SERVICE No. 47, at 2
(Apr. 20, 1991). More generally, a consistent majority felt that the American public is not
worried enough about the environment (72% in'1990, 70% in 1991). Id. at 3. A sizable
majority also felt that the government's level of concern was inadequate (75% in 1990, 73%
in 1991); as well as industry's (85% in 1990, 83% in 1991). Only 6% felt that the American
public was too concerned about the environment, 3% felt the government was too con-
cerned, and 1% felt the same for industry. Id. at 3.
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discussing extinction often empathize with the dwindling popula-
tion of a species and find the prospect lonely and a source of
sadness, 64 if only symbolically.
The Endangered Species Act 65 ("ESA") formally expresses
the depth of the American public's concern with extinction. 6 How-
ever, the reasons for preventing extinction are poorly laid out in
the statute. While the statute lists the esthetic, ecological, educa-
tional, historical, recreational, and scientific value of species as
reasons to preserve them from extinction, 67 it fails to indicate
clearly how to temper economic growth and development in order
to protect species.68 Neither the approach of the 1973 Act nor its
current amended form provides a satisfactory picture of how much
the public values species preservation and how this goal compares
with competing short- and long-term economic objectives.
Beyond the species lies the forest. Some view the forest's
value primarily in terms of the services it provides 69 or the wealth
of genetic knowledge we could gain from it,70 while others value
the esthetic or spiritual quality of wild natural areas71 and the
64. William Beebe, The Bird, Its Form and Function, quoted in THOMAS R. DUNLAP,
SAVING AMERICA'S WILDLIFE 142 (1988):
The beauty and genius of a work of art may be reconceived, though its first
material expression be destroyed; a vanished harmony may yet again inspire
the composer; but when the last individual of a race of living beings breathes
no more, another heaven and another earth must pass before such a one can
be again.
65. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
66. Charles Wilkinson describes the ethic underlying the ESA:
"[It] pulls out the best in us and ... elevates us by its proof that our unique
ability to develop technology is coupled with the capacity and will to exercise
a humane restraint in the name of a high calling, like the honest respect for
other species that exist with us in the same watershed."
Charles Wilkinson, Law and the American West: The Search for an Ethic of Place, 59 U.
COLO. L. REV. 401, 409 (1988).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3).
68. This omission may reflect the fact that widespread concern with extinction is
relatively recent. It is likely that the nascent ethic that has generated widespread support
for species preservation is evolving. The need for further evolution in both our ethic of
species preservation and our broader conservation impulses is one of the important lessons
I glean from the spotted owl controversy. See infra notes 377-384 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Mann & Plummer, supra note 47, at 50-51.
70. Gup, supra note 16, at 59. This is one of the common arguments offered in
support of the preservation of biodiversity. See also Mann & Plummer, supra note 47, at
50-51; Doremus, supra note 4, at 269-70; Tisdale, supra note 13, at 19.
71. Individuals with widely divergent views about how we should act evidence these
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particular mystery of the forest. 72 For these people, the value of
the forests cannot easily be quantified or categorized. Robert Po-
gue Harrison writes of this more elusive value of the forest in his
cultural history of forests, Forests, The Shadow of Civilization:
The global problem of deforestation provokes unlikely reac-
tions of concern these days among city dwellers, not only
because of the enormity of the scale but also because in the
depths of cultural memory forests remain the correlate of hu-
man transcendence .... [U]nderlying the ecological concern
is perhaps a much deeper apprehension about the disappear-
ance of boundaries, without which the human abode loses its
grounding . . . . Without such outside domains, there is no
inside in which to dwell.73
It is difficult but important to determine which of these com-
peting values we wish to consider, and how we want to evaluate
and prioritize them. The old-growth controversy illustrates how
inadequately our statutes address and resolve these competing
concerns.
III. THE OLD-GROWTH AND SPOTTED OWL CONTROVERSY:
LEGAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS
A. Statutory Background
The legal controversy over preservation of old-growth forests
and the spotted owl has involved action under six federal statutes:
nonrational, spiritual, esthetic affinities for the forest. As one logger commented about the
speed with which a 200-year-old tree was felled, "It's kind of sad. It affects you. I don't
think you'd be human if it didn'f." Gup, Artist with a 20-Lb. Chainsaw, supra note 32, at
61.
72. Gretel Erlich writes of nature's complexity and mystery:
Wildness has no conditions, no sure routes, no peaks or goals, no source that
is not instantly becoming something more than itself, then letting go of that,
always becoming. It cannot be stripped to its complexity by cat scan or
telescope. Rather it is a many-pointed truth, almost a bluntness, a sudden
essence like the wild strawberries strung along the ground on scarlet runners
under my feet. Wildness is source and fruition at once, as if every river circled
round, the mouth eating the tail--and the tail, the source.
Gretel Erlich, River History, in MONTANA SpAcEs: ESSAYS AND PHOTOGRAPHS IN CELE-
BRATION OF MONTANA 71-72 (William Kittredge ed., 1988).
73. HARRISON, supra note 11, at 247.
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the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"),74 the National Forest Man-
agement Act ("NFMA"),75 the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"),76 the Oregon and California Lands Act ("OCLA"), 77
the Federal Land Policy Management Act ("FLPMA"),78 and the
Migratory Birds Treaty Act ("MBTA"). 79 This plurality of relevant
statutory authority is itself telling: the controversy cuts across the
fragmented lines that have separated agencies' jurisdictions for
arbitrary or historical reasons.80 The statutes reveal a tension be-
tween Congress's commitment to preserving the environment by
tempering economic activity and a pervasive practice of delegating
important decisions to public land management agencies.
1. The Endangered Species Act
In 1973 Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act l
("ESA" or "the Act") on a strong wave of congressional support
for preserving species from extinction. 82 The Act identified the
causes of extinction as "economic growth and development untem-
pered by adequate concern and conservation. 8 3 The Act declared
that species of plants and animals already extinct and those threat-
ened with extinction were of "esthetic, ecological, educational,
historical, recreational, and scientific value" to the United States. 84
To abate the ongoing destruction of species, Congress enacted
provisions designed to prohibit direct physical harm to members
74. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
75. Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C.).
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c (1988).
77. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1181a-1181j (1988).
78. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988).
79. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-718j (1988 & Supp. 1990).
80. The NFMA applies to lands managed by the United States Forest Service within
the Department of Agriculture, notably the National Forests. See 16 U.S.C. § 1601. The
FLPMA applies to forest lands owned and managed by the BLM within the Department
of the Interior. See 43 U.S.C. § 1731. The OCLA governs the use and management of a
group of lands originally granted by the government to the railroads, then legislatively
returned to federal control following a land fraud. See 43 U.S.C. § 1181a.
81. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
82. The House Report accompanying the 1973 ESA noted that the "value of this
genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable." H.R. REP. No. 412, 93r'd Cong., 1st Sess.
4-5 (1973), quoted in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill 437 U.S. 153, 178 (1978). A
complete history of wildlife protections that preceded the statute is found in MICHAEL J.
BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (1983).
83. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3).
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of endangered species8 5 and to protect habitat essential to their
survival. 86
The legislative history of the Act includes sweeping state-
ments that indicate a firm congressional mandate to preserve every
extant species.8 7 In interpreting the Act in 1978, the Supreme Court
stated: "The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was
to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever
the cost. 88 The statute establishes a process for listing species,
prohibits the "taking" of endangered species, 9 and provides for
designation of critical habitat for listed species. 90
Because species extinctions are often the inevitable by-prod-
uct of habitat destruction, 91 the statute provides for the protection
of critical habitat for listed species. 92 While federal agency action
that would adversely modify critical habitat and jeopardize the
species is prohibited, 93 similar purely private activity is not.94 Even
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
86. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1536.
87. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9466 ("The ultimate goal of the Endangered Species Act is the con-
servation of the ecosystem on which all species, whether endangered or not, depend for
survival."). See also Tennessee Valley Authority, 437 U.S. at 176-84.
88. Tennessee Valley Authority, 437 U.S. at 184.
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). Once listed as endangered, members of a species may
not be harassed, harmed, pursued, hunted, shot, wounded, killed, trapped, captured, or
collected by any person. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (prohibiting taking); 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)
(defining "take"). The statute includes exceptions in a narrow class of situations, including
"incidental" takes. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B). The Fish and Wildlife Service also has
authority to promulgate regulations that afford threatened species the same degree of
protection from takings that endangered species are accorded under section 9(a). 16 U.S.C.§ 1533(d). This core of the statute sends a strong signal as to the significance of extinction
and the high value placed on protection.
90. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3).
91. See S. REP. No. 307, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2989, 2990; James Salzman, Evolution and Application of Critical Habitat Under the
Endangered Species Act, 14 HARV. ENV'rL. L. REv. 311, 314-15 (1990) (discussing relevant
legislative history). See also H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9455; Edwin M. Smith, The Endangered Species Act and Biological
Conservation, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 361, 362 (1984).
92. Under the statute as initially enacted, the term "critical habitat" was not defined,
leaving the Secretary of the Interior to determine its meaning and implemention. Yagerman,
supra note 4, at 828-29 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536). The following discussion of the evolution
of the critical habitat provisions draws extensively on Yagerman, supra note 4, at 828-38.
93. Section 7 requires all federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior
to insure that "any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency.., is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is
determined by the Secretary ... to be critical." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
94. Thus, critical habitat has its greatest force when it involves federally owned
lands, or lands the use of which will involve federal funding or approval. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a)(2). In contrast, the prohibition against taking of endangered or threatened species
is applicable to all actors, federal or private. Cf. Salzman, supra note 91, 327-30 (1990)
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in cases involving federal action, where the statute's potential.
power is greatest, the Act has rarely proven an obstacle to eco-
nomic activity. 95 Moreover, the pressure and opportunity for non-
scientific values to enter into the listing determination have been
documented. 96
In addition, the Act explicitly protects economic interests.
Amid controversy over the Tellico dam and the snail darter,97
Congress amended the critical habitat requirements and introduced
an exemption process into the Act.98
These amendments established a cost-benefit analysis requir-
ing that critical habitat be designated "on the basis of the best
scientific data available and after taking into consideration the
economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any
particular area as critical habitat." 99 The amended statute requires
the Secretary of the Interior to designate habitat "to the maximum
extent prudent and determinable."100 The amendments also allow
the Secretary to exclude habitat from the Act's protections if the
costs of designating an area outweigh its benefits. 0 1 The Secretary
is thus free to assess and give precedence to competing economic
and other impacts, resulting in a "highly discretionary"' 10 2 process.
(suggesting emerging proscription of private activities based on adverse modification as
form of taking).
95. In 1986, only 52 jeopardy opinions were issued by the FWS after nearly 11,000
consultations with federal agencies over potential impact on endangered species. Salzman,
supra note 91, at 335. In only two of these cases were projects blocked. See also Steven
Daugherty, Threatened Owls and Endangered Salmon: Implementing the Consultation
Requirements of the Endangered Species Act (1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with
the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (detailing limited impact that designation of
spotted owl and critical habitat has had on Forest Service and BLM activities).
96. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES: SPOTTED OWL
PETITION BESET BY PROBLEMS, GAO/RCED-89-79 (1989) [hereinafter SPOTTED OWL PE-
TITION BESET BY PROBLEMS]; Salzman, supra note 91, at 322-23,335-38 (describing pattern
of delay and circumvention of ESA's mandates by the Reagan Administration under Sec-
retary James Watt); Elliot Diringer, Delta Smelt's Friends Cry Foul, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Sept. 28, 1991, at Al (reporting claims that political influence rather than scientific
evidence led to listing of delta smelt as threatened instead of endangered).
97. For a good history of the controversy over the snail darter and the Tellico dam,
see Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law Paradigm
and its Consequences, 19 MICH. J. L. REFORM 805, 806-18 (1986) [hereinafter Plater, In
tire Wake]. See also Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Reflected in a River: Agency Accountability and
the TVA Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN. L. REv. 747 (1982).
98. For a discussion of legislative debate, see Salzman, supra note 91, at 317-19.
99. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3).
101. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). This authority to exclude is denied in cases where the
Secretary determines "based on the best scientific and commercial data available, that the
failure to designate such area as critical habitat will result in the extinction of the species
concerned." Id.
102. See Salzman, supra note 91, at 332 (documenting that during 1980-1988, Fish
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The amended statute also authorizes exemptions where the
economic benefits of a project that jeopardizes a species outweigh
the economic benefits of alternatives. A new entity known as the
Endangered Species Committee 13 was authorized to grant peti-
tions for exemptions1°4 after weighing the costs and benefits of
alternatives and considering whether the action is of regional or
national significance and in the public interest. 105
Despite the inclusion of these cost-benefit analyses, the ESA
clearly remains anti-extinction. 10 6 Extinction of plant and animal
species is proscribed in all cases but those in which the Committee
decides that preservation impermissibly conflicts with both eco-
nomic activity of regional or national significance, and the general
public interest. 107
2. The National Forest Management Act
The National Forest Management Act108 ("NFMA") is the
second statute that played a major role in the old-growth contro-
versy. The conflict in the Pacific Northwest represents one strand
in the debate over the proper use of national forests that began
and Wildlife Service declined to designate habitats in 320 cases, and justified 317 of those
cases on grounds that designation was not "prudent"). Only 22% of the listed species whose
habitats are found in the United States have critical habitat designated. Id. at 332. The
legislative history of the prudence limitation demonstrates that this exception was intended
to be applicable "only in rare circumstances," such as in the case of cacti that are notably
susceptible to depredation by collectors. Id. at 334.
103. This Committee is composed of the Secretaries of Agriculture, the Interior, and
the Army; the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors; the Administrators of EPA
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; and one individual from each
affected state appointed by the President. The Endangered Species Commmittee is com-
monly referred to as the "God Squad" for the power over the fate of species accorded to
it by the statute. See Jared des Rosiers, Note, The Exemption Process Under the Endan-
gered Species Act: How the "God Squad" Works and Why, 66 NOTRE DAME L. R-v. 825,
845-46 (1991).
104. The Committee can grant exemptions in theory only after the relevant federal
agency has consulted with the Secretary of the Interior "in good faith and made a reasonable
and responsible effort to develop and fairly consider modifications or reasonable and
prudent alternatives to the proposed agency action." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(3)(A)(i). Critics
have pointed out that this requirement was not enforced in the spotted owl controversy.
See Tom Kenworthy, Interior Secretary at Center of Storm over Handling of Ovl Contro-
versy, WASH. PosT, March 22, 1992, at A8; infra note 233.
105. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1).
106. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c).
107. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A).
108. Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
16 U.S.C.).
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with the first public forests in the late 1800s.109 As public awareness
has fluctuated throughout the century, concern over logging in the
national forests has simmered and periodically erupted.110
In 1976, Congress enacted the NFMA in response to public
outcry about abusive logging practices, deviation from long-stand-
ing multiple-use, sustained yield principles, and the "economic
irrationality" of many timber policies. n To remedy these prob-
lems, the NFMA and its immediate predecessor, the Forest and
Rangeland Renewable Resources and Planning Act1 2 ("RPA"),
imposed planning requirements on the Forest Service and provided
some guidance on acceptable management practices.11 3
The NFMA established several substantive standards in-
tended to go beyond the vague "multiple-use" mandate of prior
law, requiring Forest Service land management plans to consider
economic and environmental factors in providing for "outdoor
recreation (including wilderness), range, timber, watershed, wild-
life, and fish" and maintaining the diversity of plant and animal
communities 114
The NFMA requires the Forest Service to provide for diver-
sity of plant and animal communities, including native tree species,
"within the multiple-use objectives of a land management plan,"
"where appropriate," and "to the degree practicable."11 5 Although
this language was enacted to reorder the agency's priorities be-
109. For a readable history, see WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 15-90,
130-200.
110. See id. at 17, 27, 29-31, 33, 40-42, 69-70, 138-54.
111. Catalysts for the law included revelations about the damage caused by clear-
cutting and the failure of reforestation efforts. See id. at 134-36, 139-40, 154. The Multiple
Use-Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 ("MUSYA"), 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1988 & Supp. 1992),
provided only the most general mandate to the Forest Service. It directed the agency to
manage national forests for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and fish and
wildlife purposes. 16 U.S.C. § 528. Because Congress declined to specify any priorities
among these uses or procedures for resolving conflicts among these uses, the MUSYA was
of limited impact. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 72-73, 286-87; BEAN,
supra note 82, at 141-43, 153.
112. Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 ("RPA"), 16
U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1988).
113. Under the NFMA and the RPA, the Forest Service was required to engage in
a massive, tiered, long-term planning process for the entire national forest system, for each
region, and for each individual forest. See 16 U.S.C. § 1600.
114. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(A)-(B). The accompanying regulations require the Forest
Service to consider factors including "the landscape's visual attractiveness and the public's
visual expectation." 36 C.F.R. § 219.21(f).
115. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B). In response to the objections of the Forest Service
chief, the Senate rejected language that would have required the Forest Service to maintain
"the diversity of forest types and species found naturally in each national forest." See
WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 294.
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tween timber harvesting and wildlife, Congress ultimately left to
the Forest Service and a Committtee of Scientists1 6 the task of
working out the specific standards to be applied.1 7 Because the
language provides only a germ of policy, leaving its fuller revela-
tion to the agency's discretion,'"8 the statute creates no enforceable
duty to preserve biological diversity." 9 Despite the statute's broad
grant of discretion, the agency's regulations provide greater detail
and constraints on the agency's conduct. For example, the regu-
lations require planners in implementing the diversity requirement
to "preserve and enhance the diversity of plant and animal com-
munities ... so that it is at least as great as that which would be
expected in a natural forest.' ' 20 The regulations also require that
"[f]ish and wildlife habitat shall be managed to maintain viable
populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate
species" found within a planning area.'2' The Forest Service must
select Management Indicator Species ("MIS"), 22 and then estab-
lish "objectives for the maintenance and improvement of habitat"
for these species. 23
While still leaving considerable discretion, the regulations pro-
vide some clear and enforceable requirements designed to ensure
that diversity is maintained and increased. The NFMA fails to
answer most of the hard questions of how to resolve conflicting
values, but it makes resolution of these conflicts part of the agen-
cy's mandate.
116. The Committee of Scientists was created by the NFMA to provide advice on
regulations implementing the act. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h).
117. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 170-73 (discussing history of
compromise that produced diversity provision).
118. While "it is difficult to discern any concrete legal standards on the face of the
provision," id. at 296, these provisions represented a significant departure from the tradi-
tional unfettered discretion that had characterized national forest management prior to the
NFMA, id. at 69-74, and the statute imposed some enforceable duties on the agency for
the first time.
119. But see infra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
120. 36 C.F.R. § 219.27(g). Reductions in diversity of plant and animal communities
and tree species are permitted, however, "where needed to meet overall multiple-use
objectives." Id.
121. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19. The regulations define "viable populations" as requiring not
only sufficient numbers of animals, but also their adequate distribution. Id.
122. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(1). The regulations provide for selection "where appro-
priate" of MIS's if they are representative of one of five categories. One such category
includes ecological indicator species. Thus far, however, most planners have declined to
choose MIS's from this category. WILKINsON & ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 301.
123. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a).
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3. The National Environmental Policy Act
The National Environmental Policy Act 124 ("NEPA") sets
forth a policy favoring the preservation of the natural
environment' 25 for future generations 126 with the least unnecessary
degradation possible. 2 7 Although NEPA does not prescribe or
require any particular level of environmental preservation, it seeks
to promote rational decisionmaking by government agencies
through consideration of complete information on environmental
consequences. 12 8
To this end, NEPA requires all federal agencies to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") in conjunction with
every major federal action that significantly affects the human
environment.' 2 9 Since NEPA requires only "consideration" of in-
formation, its mandate is procedural, not substantive. 30 Comple-
tion of an EIS, however, does not necessarily satisfy NEPA's
procedural duties. When new information on environmental impact
develops after completion of the EIS and the agency has not yet
acted, the agency must evaluate the information to determine if
the proposed federal action will affect the quality of the human
environment "in a significant manner or to a significant extent not
already considered.' 3' If the action will have such an effect, a
supplemental EIS must be prepared.
4. The Oregon and California Lands Act
In 1937, Congress passed the Oregon and California Lands
Act 32 ("OCLA") to provide guidance to the General Land Office
124. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4361.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1).
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3).
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The regulations promulgated by the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality describe in detail the process for preparing an EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1-
.25. After determining the proper scope for its EIS, the agency must prepare a document
that considers the impacts of and alternatives to the proposed actions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C).
130. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
"[O]nce an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the
only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental conse-
quences." Id. at 227-28, quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 391, 410 n.21 (1976).
131. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resource Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989). An
agency's decision not to supplement its EIS following such a development will be subject
to judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Id. at 377.
132. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1181a-1181j (1988).
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on how to manage some 2.5 million acres that had been returned
to federal control after a period in private hands.' Under the
OCLA, the Department of the Interior manages the lands for
permanent forest production under the principle of sustained
yield.134 Congress mandated that the entire annual sustained yield
capacity be sold if such was possible at reasonable market
prices.1 35 Under the OCLA's terms, fifty percent of the gross
receipts from timber sales on the lands are returned to eighteen
western Oregon counties.13 6 The goal of providing a permanent
source of materials "for the support of dependent communities
and local industries of the region" is explicit in the statute. 137
Despite the language in the OCLA regarding protection of
watersheds and recreational facilities, BLM has clearly placed
timber as the dominant priority, narrowly interpreting the other
considerations. The BLM's interpretation has been upheld in a
recent decision by the Ninth Circuit, Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau
of Land Management. 38 In that case, plaintiffs challenged BLM's
management of its OCLA lands on the grounds that it had failed
to manage for multiple uses, including wildlife conservation, and
that this was inconsistent with Congress's mandate to consider
"forest production.' 1 39 The court rejected this argument and held
that BLM did not err in concluding that the statute envisioned
133. The lands were part of 3.7 million acres that had initially been granted to the
Oregon & California Railroad in 1887. Following a period of fraud and scandal, in 1916,
Congress took back the land. Kathie Durbin, BLM Mandate Collides with Owl in Special
Report, Northwest Forests, supra note 16, at 10.
134. The OCLA requires land management under sustained yield principles:
for the purpose of providing a permanent source of timber supply, protecting
watersheds, regulating stream flow, and contributing to the economic stability
of local communities and industries, and providing recreational facilties [sic].
43 U.S.C. § 1181a. The statute provides a narrow exception allowing the Secretary of the
Interior to reclassify lands that in his or her judgment are more suitable for agricultural
use. 43 U.S.C. § 118-1c.
135. 43 U.S.C. § 1181a.
136. See 43 U.S.C. § 1181f(a). Twenty-five percent of the receipts were initially
allotted to pay taxes owed on the land for years prior to March 1, 1938. The remainder of
the receipts is payable to federal agencies for administration of the Act with any unused
funds going to the U.S. Treasury. 43 U.S.C. § 1181f(c).
137. See 43 U.S.C. § 1181a (allowing Interior to subdivide lands into sustained yield
units to facilitate these purposes). Congress also provided the Secretary with authority to
lease lands for grazing, as long as it did not interfere with timber production. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1181d.
138. 914 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1990). This decision was followed by the district court
in Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 1991 WL 81838, at *4 (D. Or. May 8, 1991).
139. 914 F.2d at 1183.
Beyond the Spotted Owl
timber production as a dominant use. 140 "There is no indication
that Congress intended 'forest' to mean anything beyond an ag-
gregation of timber resources.' ' 41 Thus, beyond the virtually unen-
forceable mandate of sustainable forestry and concern for wa-
tershed protection, the OCLA emphasizes production and revenue
rather than environmental concerns.
5. The Federal Lands Policy Management Act
The Federal Lands Policy Management Act142 ("FLPMA")
gives BLM authority to manage its one hundred and seventy mil-
lion acres of primarily arid and semi-arid land. 143 In enacting the
FLPMA, Congress was primarily concerned with the historic ov-
ergrazing that had degraded a substantial portion of BLM's
rangeland. 144
Like the NFMA, the FLPMA requires extensive planning by
BLM, 145 yet provides only general guidance concerning the con-
tents of those plans. 146 The FLPMA specifically provides that the
principles of multiple-use and sustained yield should govern BLM
administration of public lands. 147 The definition of multiple-use
explicitly states that BLM must manage the lands so as to avoid
"permanent impairment of the productivity of the land and the
quality of the environment with consideration being given to the
relative values of the resources and not necessarily to the combi-
nation of uses that will give the greatest economic return or the
greatest unit output.' 148
140. Id. at 1184.
141. Id. at 1183.
142. 43 U.S.C. § 1701-1784 (1988).
143. George C. Coggins et al., The Law of Public Rangeland Management I: The
Extent and Distribution of Federal Power, 12 ENVTL. L. 535, 535-36 (1982).
144. For a history of BLM rangeland management and the evolution of legislative
controls, see George C. Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management IV: FLPMA,
PRIA, and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L. 1 (1983) [hereinafter, Coggins, Range-
land Management VJ; George C. Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management
III: A Survey of Creeping Regulation at the Periphery, 1934-1982, 13 ENVTL. L. 295 (1983);
George C. Coggins & Margaret Lindberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Manage-
ment II: The Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1 (1982); and Coggins et al.,
supra note 143. The FLPMA is relevant to the old-growth and spotted owl controversy
because of BLM's authority over the rich forests that comprise OCLA lands.
145. 43 U.S.C. § 1711-1712.
146. See 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c(1)-(8).
147. 43 U.S.C. 88 1701(a)(7), 1702(c), 1702(h), 1711, 1712, 1732. See Coggins, Range-
land Management IV, supra note 144, at 12.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 1702(c).
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Wisely or unwisely, Congress declined to dictate the precise
balance to be achieved among these values in particular resource
conflicts, but it clearly made protection of the quality of the en-
vironment and the preservation of some of its key elements rele-
vant to BLM land management decisions. These environmental
values are protected to some extent by the FLPMA. The only
question is to what extent.
B. History of the Litigation
Through the application of these statutes in litigation, both
the timber industry and environmental groups have catalyzed ex-
ecutive and legislative action. The fact that the old-growth contro-
versy gave rise to litigation under these laws is not surprising,
since the statutes simultaneously promote both economic activity
that can deplete resources and the preservation of natural resource
values.
The effort to resolve the old-growth controversy under these
laws tests the statutes' effectiveness in accommodating the com-
peting values that Congress directed the agencies to consider in
managing national forestlands. This section will discuss three
pieces of litigation rising from this statutory background: two sig-
nificant cases challenging Forest Service and BLM timber sales
and management plans for old-growth forests, and a suit under the
ESA concerning the spotted owl.
1. Challenges to Forest Service and BLM Forest Management
An Oregon Endangered Species Task Force first developed
species protection guidelines for the Forest Service in 1977, based
on the NFMA and its species viability requirement. Evolving data
on the owl's decline, however, showed that the initial guidelines
were not sufficiently protective. 149 Citizens challenged the agency's
adoption of a Spotted Owl Management Plan administratively. The
Forest Service denied the citizens' appeal, but stated that it would
revisit the question of spotted owl management in a forthcoming
Forest Service Regional Guide. 50
149. See ISC REPORT, supra note 16, 50 app. B at 52-53.
150. Sher & Stahl, supra note 11, at 363-64.
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The Forest Service initiated an Old Growth Wildlife Research
and Development Program in cooperation with BLM in 1982.
When the Forest Service revealed its final spotted owl management
strategy in its 1984 Regional Guide, a number of conservation
groups challenged the Guide as inadequate, citing the Forest Ser-
vice's failure to produce an EIS addressing the strategy's impacts
on the owl. 51 The deputy chief of the Forest Service sustained
this challenge and ordered Region 6 of the Forest Service to pre-
pare a supplemental impact statement on the spotted owl standards
and guidelines. 152 Knowledge about the owl increased throughout
the 1980s and various state agencies endeavored to provide addi-
tional protection with limited success. 153
Two major lawsuits initiated in the late 1980s grew out of
ongoing efforts to challenge Forest Service and BLM clearcutting
of the last old-growth forests in the Pacific Northwest. These two
cases achieved the most significant success to date in the effort to
protect the old growth. The history of this litigation highlights the
statutes' role in shaping and resolving the dispute over old-growth
forest preservation.
a. The Portland Audubon Society Litigation
In Portland Audubon Society v. Hodel,154 plaintiffs sought to
enjoin all BLM 55 timber sales of old-growth Douglas fir trees over
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. ISC REPORT, supra note 16, 50 app. B.
154. 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,210 (D. Or. Apr. 20, 1988) (granting
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 866 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1989), on remand sub nom., Portland Audubon Soc'y v.
Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456 (D. Or. 1989) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment
and vacating preliminary injunction), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 884 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir.
1989) (upholding dismissal of NEPA claim but reversing as to other claims), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1026 (1990), on remand, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,018 (D. Or. Dec.
21, 1989) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss on mootness grounds), rev'd sub nom.,
Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd 112 S.Ct. 1407
(1992), 1990 WL 169703 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 1990) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction), vacated and remanded, 931 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1991),
on remand, 1991 WL 81838 (D. Or. May 8, 1991) (granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment on claims under the OCLA and MBTA, but denying same as to claims under
FLPMA), later proceeding sub nom., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 784 F. Supp. 786
(D. Or. 1992) (granting plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction), later proceeding, 795
F. Supp. 1489 (D. Or. 1992) (granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denying
defendant's motion to vacate preliminary injunction).
155. Although most forest land managed for timber falls under the Forest Service's
jurisdiction and is governed by the NFMA, for historical reasons, BLM manages consid-
erable tracts of old growth under two other organic statutes: the FLPMA and the OCLA.
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200 years old within 2.1 miles of known spotted owl habitat, claim-
ing the sales violated four federal laws: NEPA, 15 6 the OCLA, 157
the FLPMA, 158 and the MBTA.159 The principal claims about
BLM's sales were (1) the failure to prepare a supplemental EIS
examining new information on the spotted owl violated NEPA,16°
and (2) the failure to consider the impact on the owl of BLM's
Forest Resources Policy Statement favoring management of land
for timber production was inconsistent with the multiple-use man-
date of the FLPMA.161
The first claim challenged BLM's decision not to prepare a
supplemental EIS examining new information about the effects of
cutting old growth on the survival of the owl as a species. Although
BLM acknowledged in district EIS's that cutting old growth
harmed individual owls, it had never examined the cumulative
impacts of all such cutting on the owl as a species. The new
information on which plaintiffs relied involved precisely this is-
156. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370c.
157. Plaintiffs argued unsuccessfully that the OCLA's mandate for management of
the relevant lands "for permanent forest production . . . for the purpose of providing a
permanent source of timber supply, protecting watersheds, regulating stream flow, and
contributing to the economic stability of local communities and providing recreational
facilities," 43 U.S.C. § 1181a, required BLM to manage OCLA lands for multiple uses,
including wildlife conservation. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, Civ. No. 87-1160-FR,
1991 WL 81838 at *3-*4 (D. Or. May 8, 1991). They challenged BLM's Forest Resource
Policy Statement, which precluded withdrawal of lands for spotted owl habitat, as incon-
sistent with the multiple-use obligation. Id. The District Court rejected this contention,
relying on a Ninth Circuit decision interpreting the OCLA. Id. (citing Headwaters, Inc. v.
Bureau of Land Management, 914 F.2d 1174, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 1990) (ruling Congress's
mandate for sustained yield production foreclosed BLM's consideration of withdrawal of
land for non-productive purposes, such as wildlife habitat)). See supra notes 138-141 and
accompanying text.
158. 43 U.S.C. 88 1701-1784.
159. 16 U.S.C. § 703-718j (1988 & Supp. 1990). Plaintiffs in both Portland Audubon
Society and Seattle Audubon Society, discussed infra part III.B.l.b., unsuccessfully as-
serted the protections of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. They argued that the spotted owl
was a migratory bird protected from "taking" under the MBTA, and that since Forest
Service and BLM policies would lead to the death of many owls, they constituted takings.
In a consolidated appeal on the issue, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower courts' rulings to
the contrary, finding that the definition of "taking" under the MBTA narrowly proscribed
only direct acts of depredation. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th
Cir. 1991).
160. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456, 1485 (D. Or. 1989).
161. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,210. Plaintiffs had first
requested that the agency prepare supplemental environmental impact statements ("SEISs")
on spotted owl impacts. BLM prepared an environmental assessment based on which it
decided not to supplement its EIS. After the Interior Board of Land Appeals failed to act,
plaintiffs initiated the litigation, challenging the failure to prepare SEISs and alleging
violations of the OCLA, the FLPMA, and the MBTA. Id. at 21,211.
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sue-the cumulative risks to the owl's survival as a species from
all old growth cutting, including BLM's. 162 The plaintiffs ultimately
prevailed on this claim, based on evidence showing significant new
information about the owl's status as a species. 16 NEPA prevented
BLM from taking further actions without first considering this
information in a supplemental EIS, thus providing an effective tool
for forcing BLM to account for information that did not support
its timber sale program. 164
Only after some four years of litigation, six trips to the Ninth
Circuit, 165 one decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, 166 and innu-
merable hearings, did the plaintiffs finally receive a decision in
their favor on the NEPA claim and the injunctive relief they re-
quested.1 67 The injunction ensured that further logging of owl hab-
itat would not occur until BLM completed an EIS that took into
account the new information about the spotted owl's status. In
light of the concurrent developments in the ESA litigation, 1 8 this
ruling helped ensure that decisions on future sales would take
account of the Fish and Wildlife Service's critical habitat desig-
nation and recovery plan and the mandates of the ESA.
162. The regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality elaborate
on NEPA's mandate for a "detailed statement." They require that the statement consider
the different actions involved, the environmental impacts of the actions, and alternatives
to the proposed action, including the alternative of no action. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14,
1502.16 & 1508.25(a) (1992).
163. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 1992 WL 130847 (D. Or. June 8, 1992).
164. Plaintiffs also brought claims under the FLPMA, which requires BLM to pursue
a policy of multiple use and sustained yield on the lands that it manages. Ultimately, they
did not pursue their FLPMA claim after obtaining injunctive relief under NEPA. Since the
FLPMA grants broad discretion to BLM to consider environmental values, it seems doubt-
ful that plaintiffs could have obtained substantive review under the FLPMA of BLM's
judgment according weight to ecological values represented by the owl or by old-growth
forests.
Further, the FLPMA exempts from the constraints of its multiple-use mandate lands
dedicated to specific uses governed by other law. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a). Since the lands
subject to BLM control were also subject to the specific mandates of the OCLA, they
might be "dedicated to specific uses" in a way that would vitiate the general mandate of
the FLPMA.
165. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991); Seattle Audubon
Soc'y v. Lujan, 940 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1991); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 931
F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1991); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir.
1990); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 884 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1989); Portland Audubon
Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1989).
166. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 112 S.Ct. 1407 (1992).
167. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 1992 WL 130847 (D. Or., June 8, 1992).
168. See infra part III.B.2.
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b. The Seattle Audubon Society Litigation
In 1984, the Forest Service designated the northern spotted
owl as a Management Indicator Species ("MIS") 169 in national
forests in Washington and Oregon under the NFMA. Accordingly,
the Forest Service adopted guidelines pursuant to the NFMA on
managing spotted owl habitat in these forests. Environmental
groups challenged these early guidelines and the Forest Service
promulgated an amended version in 1988.170 The groups then chal-
lenged these final guidelines administratively.17 1 In February 1989,
a coalition of environmental groups filed suit challenging the owl
management plan and seeking injunctions to prevent timber sales
in owl habitat under the NFMA, NEPA, and the MBTA.
Plaintiffs in Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans172 sought judi-
cial review of the Forest Service's management guidelines for the
spotted owl under the NFMA and challenged the Forest Service's
failure to supplement its EIS to address significant new information
about the 6wl. They obtained preliminary injunctive relief to halt
timber sales in spotted owl habitat areas until the Forest Service
complied with the NFMA by adopting standards and guidelines to
assure that a viable population of the species would be maintained
in the forests. 173
In its decision granting preliminary injunctive relief, the court
made extensive findings on the flagrant violations of the NFMA
and other law by the Forest Service. 74 The court concluded: "The
169. See supra note 122.
170. See ISC REPORT, supra note 16, 50 app. B at 54, 57.
171. Id. at 57.
172. 771 F. Supp. 1081 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
173. Id. at 1096.
174. The court included in its finding testimony from a variety of Forest Service
officials and employees, including Dr. Eric Forsman, a wildlife biologist and leading au-
thority on the spotted owl:
On all of those plans, I had considerable reservations for a variety of reasons.
But primarily because in every instance, there was a considerable-I would
emphasize considerable-amount of political pressure to create a plan which
was an absolute minimum. That is, which had a very low probability of success
[in maintaining a viable population of owls] and which had a minimum impact
on timber harvest.
771 F. Supp. at 1089. The Associate Chief of the Forest Service, George Leonard, testified
that the Secretaries of the Interior and of Agriculture deliberately ignored a congressional
mandate, enacted in the wake of the plaintiffs' early successes, which directed the Forest
Service to develop a revised plan for protection of the owl by September 1990. See id.
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most recent violation of the NFMA exemplifies a deliberate and
systematic refusal by the Forest Service and the FWS to comply
with the laws protecting wildlife .... [which] reflects decisions
made by higher authorities in the executive branch of govern-
ment."'175 The court (1) barred timber sales within old-growth areas
that might provide spotted owl habitat; (2) ordered the Forest
Service to develop standards and guidelines to ensure the spotted
owl's viability as required by NFMA; and (3) ordered the agency
to prepare an environmental impact statement on those
guidelines. 176
The owl was considered by many to be "the cause" of the
injunction, which had the potential to delay eighty percent of the
timber sales in federal forests in Washington and Oregon for at
least ten months. 77 Forest Service employees began to find owls
that had been shot and nailed to signs.178 The timber industry and
its dependent communities led a massive outcry that continues
today, challenging the ethics of a law putting tens of thousands of
people out of work while saving a single species. 79 At the same
time, the decimation of the old-growth forests gained new public
attention.
c. The Hatfield Riders
The government and industry asserted a number of defenses
in the litigation, but the only defense accepted by the courts in-
volved a series of congressional appropriation measures that re-
stricted judicial review of certain BLM and Forest Service deci-
Instead of making public their decision to ignore the law, the two agencies directed the
Forest Service staff to halt work on the plan and appointed an "interagency team" to
develop an alternative to protection of the owl. That team failed to develop any plan. Id.
at 1090.
175. Id. at 1090.
176. Id. at 1096. See also Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 20 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,167 (W.D. Wash. May 11, 1990) (granting injunction to prevent timber
sale based on Forest Service's failure to consider section 318 of FY 1990 appropriations
measure requiring minimum fragmentation of ecologically significant old growth).
177. See Bill Dietrich & David Schaefer, Owl Ruling Halts Logging in Much of
Northwest, SEATrLE TIMEs, May 24, 1991, at Al. The injunction was expected to affect
66,000 acres of planned sales for the next sixteen months. John Lancaster, Environmen-
talists Hail Freeze on Timber Sales to Guard Owl, WASH. POST, May 25, 1991, at A2.
178. See Endangered Owl Nailed to Park Sign, supra note 50.
179. See, e.g., Timber Workers Rally Against Latest Spotted Owl Safeguards, L.A.
TIMEs, May 25, 1991, at A21.
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sions. These measures are known informally as the Hatfield
riders. 18 0
The Hatfield riders were part of an ongoing effort by the
Pacific Northwest congressional delegation to guarantee high lev-
els of timber sales from the national forests. The riders were also
a specific response to the litigation concerning the spotted owl and
old-growth forest protection. 181 In both the FY 1988 and 1989
budget resolutions, 182 these riders modified the commands of
NEPA, the NFMA, and the FLPMA, by limiting or eliminating
judicial review of BLM and Forest Service management plans and
requiring both agencies to complete development of the resource
management plans as required by the NFMA and FLPMA "as
expeditiously as possible."' 83 The bills declared that while
"[nlothing shall limit judicial review of particular activities on these
lands," 4 "there shall be no challenges to any existing [Forest
Service] plan on the sole basis that the plan in its entirety is
outdated, or in the case of the Bureau of Land Management, solely
on the basis that the plan does not incorporate information avail-
able subsequent to the completion of the existing plan.' 18 5 They
further provided that "any and all particular activities to be carried
out under existing plans may nevertheless be challenged.' '8 6
180. For a thorough discussion of these riders, named after Senator Mark Hatfield,
their chief sponsor, see Victor M. Sher & Carol Sue Hunting, Eroding the Landscape,
Eroding the Laws: Congressional Exemptions from Judicial Review of Environmental Laivs,
15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 435 (1991); Linda M. Bolduan, The Hatfield Riders: Eliminating
the Role of the Courts in Environmental Decision Making, 20 ENVTL. L. 329 (1990).
181. In addition to the Seattle Audubon and Portland Audubon cases described supra
parts III.B.l.a-b, the riders also successfully undercut the most direct and broad challenge
to Forest Service old-growth policies. See Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla,
19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,177 (D. Or. May 25, 1989), aff'd, 895 F.2d 627 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1990) (refusing to reach NEPA challenge to proposed
Forest Service timber sale based on agency's failure to incorporate significant new infor-
mation about old-growth forest ecosystems in environmental assessment, on grounds that
1988 continuing budget resolution withdrew jurisdiction over issue).
182. Continuing Resolution, H.J. Res. 395, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 314, 101 Stat.
1329-214, 1329-254 (1987). The same measure was reenacted the following year. Pub. L.
No. 100-446, § 314, 102 Stat. 1774, 1825-26 (1988).
183. § 314, 101 Stat. 1329-254; § 314, 102 Stat. 1825.
184. Id. Despite apparently allowing challenges to individual sales, this provision
was interpreted in Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456, 1489 (D. Or.
1989), and in Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla, 1989 WL 200886, at *5 (D. Or.
May 25, 1989), to preclude even challenges to individual sales, if the nature of the challenge
to the sale would require the agency to change policies set in its planning process.
185. § 314, 101 Stat. 1329-254; § 314, 102 Stat. 1825-26.
186. Id.
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The District Court initially dismissed the complaint in the
Portland Audubon Society litigation on defendants' motion, finding
that section 314 of the Continuing Budget Resolution18 7 withdrew
the court's jurisdiction over the complaint.' 88 On remand, following
a reversal by the Ninth Circuit on the proper interpretation of
section 314,189 the court found BLM's decision not to prepare a
supplemental EIS addressing the critical "issues of adequate pop-
ulation size or the effects of habitat fragmentation upon the long-
range survival of the spotted owl" arbitrary and capricious. 190
Notwithstanding the earlier reversal by the Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, the court again found the NEPA claim barred by section
314.191 Thus, to the extent BLM had violated NEPA by failing to
acknowledge the plight of the owl in the EIS, Congress's more
recent enactment placed the violation beyond judicial reach.
Congress again responded to the ongoing litigation by adopting
sections 312 and 318 of the FY 1990 Interior Appropriations Act.192
Section 312 of the 1990 Act reenacted the restrictions of section
314 of the 1988 and 1989 resolutions. Section 318 continued to
insulate the Forest Service and BLM plans from judicial review,
but did require the Forest Service to follow its own old-growth
policy mandating "minimum fragmentation" of particular old
growth. 193 The section also purported to resolve the issues raised
in the litigation by setting out general guidelines involving the
187. See Continuing Resolution, supra note 182.
188. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,210,
21,213 (D. Or. Apr. 20, 1988).
189. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding no
repeal of existing laws in section 314, thus requiring District Court to address factual
questions whether plaintiffs relied solely on "new information" and whether they challenged
"particular sales").
190. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. at 1485.
191. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 712 F.Supp. at 1489, aff'd, 884 F.2d 1233
(9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1026 (1990). To determine the viability of plaintiffs'
NEPA claim in light of section 314, the court reviewed in detail the substance of the "new
information," both documentary and testimonial. 712 F. Supp. at 1462-82. The Court
interpreted section 314 to preclude all challenges based on new information that was not
site-specific. Since plaintiffs were challenging BLM's failure to supplement its impact
statements with new information on the owl that was not site-specific, the Court found that
their claim fell within the proscription of section 314. Id. at 1489.
192. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, §§ 312,
318, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701, 743, 745-50 (1989) [hereinafter sections 312 and
318].
193. Id. § 318(b)(1), (2).
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number of board feet to be sold and the precautions to be taken
to protect owl habitat. 194
The 1990 rider declared that compliance with its directives
would constitute "adequate consideration for the purpose of meet-
ing the statutory requirements that are the basis for [the Portland
and Seattle litigation]." '95 The rider also barred judicial review of
agency guidelines issued to implement its mandate1 96 and prohib-
ited federal courts from awarding preliminary injunctions or re-
straining orders in cases challenging timber sales in the thirteen
national forests known to contain northern spotted owls or any
grounds other than noncompliance with section 318's own guide-
lines. 197 To gain political support for the riders, proponents relied
heavily on the argument that environmentalists were raising friv-
olous challenges. 198 They portrayed the riders as essential to bring
closure to the already-lengthy planning process which was other-
wise doomed by the evolving state of scientific knowledge and
never-ending challenges based on' this newly developed
information. 199
The riders drastically curtailed public participation in the plan-
ning process during the years they were effective and virtually
eliminated judicial review of the planning process. 200 The riders
seem completely inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the
NFMA, a statute that created a process for planning on a "bottom
up" model. 201 However, proponents of the riders emphasized that
rather than broadly challenging the Forest Service's decisions, the
194. Id. § 318(a)(1), (b).
195. Id. § 318(b)(6)(A).
196. Id. Congress directed the Forest Service to "review and revise as appropriate"
its 1988 Record of Decision, and to "consider" any new information including the ISC
Report. Id. § 318(g)(6)(B).
197. Id. § 318(g)(1). Section 318(d) further provided that there should be no more
than one level of administrative appeal of any Forest Service or BLM decision regarding
timber sales for the fiscal year in the forests known to contain spotted owls. Id. § 318(d).
198. See, e.g., CONG. REC. S8,797 (daily ed. July 26, 1989) (statement of Senator
Slade Gorton).
199. See Letter from Senator Mark 0. Hatfield to constituents, excerpted in WILD
OR.: J. OR. NAT. RESOURCES COUNCIL 22 (Fall 1988), quoted in Bolduan, supra note 180,
at 332, 362. Similar sentiments were expressed in oversight hearings conducted by a Senate
Subcommittee in November 1991 on the effect of appeals of forest plans on timber supply.
See Forest Service Appeals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands, National
Parks and Forests of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-7, 18, 28, 30-31, 35-36 (1991).
200. Bolduan, supra note 180, at 370-75, argues that such preemption of judicial
review in environmental cases eliminates an essential balance in the administrative process.
201. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 90.
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legal claims in the spotted owl cases focused solely on a single
species, while interfering with millions of acres of potential timber
sales. This characterization played an important role in trivializing
the litigation and the values at issue, allowing a small but powerful
minority in Congress to sidestep the protections of the NFMA,
the FLPMA, NEPA, and the ESA for several years.
The heavy-handed intervention by Congress in the pending
litigation led to a separation-of-powers challenge to section 318
which prevailed in the Ninth Circuit.2 2 Although this ruling was
ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court in March 1992,203 the
Ninth Circuit victory was of great importance. Until the reversal
by the Supreme Court, the ruling stayed the effect of sections 312
and 318. The District Court in the Seattle litigation continued to
hear challenges to individual sales and to impose injunctions pend-
ing the ruling by the Supreme Court.2°4 Despite Congress's effort
to end-run both the statutes and the courts, between 1990 and 1992
the courts continued to enforce the requirements of the ESA, the
NFMA, and NEPA. 20 5
The Seattle and Portland cases are important for several rea-
sons. First, plaintiffs' early success in obtaining injunctive relief
provided the leverage necessary to force the federal agencies to
202. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990).
203. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 112 S.Ct. 1407 (1992). For a discussion
of this decision, see Michael C. Blumm, Ancient Forests and the Supreme Court: Issuing
a Blank Check for Appropriation Riders, 43 WASH. U. J. URBAN & CONTEMP. L. 35 (1993).
204. Section 312 continued to bar injunctive relief in the Portland case until February
1992. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 755 (D. Or. 1991) (holding that
§ 312 continued to bar plaintiffs' NEPA claim after expiration of relevant appropriations
year), rev'd sub nom., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 952 297 (9th Cir. 1991); Portland
Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 784 F. Supp. 786, 792 (D. Or. 1992) (granting plaintiffs' motion
for preliminary injunction).
205. Implementation of these mandates was largely achieved through the courts. A
consistent theme in the rulings in the Seattle litigation is the agencies' deliberate and
systematic violation of the requirements of the ESA, NEPA, and the NFMA. See, e.g.,
Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1089-90, 1096 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
An important ruling ultimately limiting the impact of the riders was the decision by the
Ninth Circuit in a consolidated appeal, Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297,
303-04 (1991), holding that each appropriations rider was effective only during the fiscal
year of the appropriation and did not effect a permanent change in the law.
Ultimately, in 1991, after concerted lobbying and the intensive publicity surrounding
the case brought national attention to the old-growth controversy, a majority of Congress
refused to support further riders. At that point, plaintiffs' NEPA claim prevailed. See
Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 1992 WL 130,847 (D. Or. June 8, 1992). A proposed,
rider to the 1993 appropriations measure, which would have authorized "salvage" sales in
old-growth areas and waived the requirements of the ESA and NEPA, was defeated in the
Senate by a vote of 60 to 35 in August 1992. See Senate Defeats Proposal to Log in Spotted
Owl Habitat, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1992, at A4.
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acknowledge the risks to the owl and to develop a strategy for
protecting the owl. Without the injunctions, which prevented log-
ging in old-growth forests, the Forest Service and BLM would
undoubtedly have continued to downplay the risks to the owl,
quite possibly until the owl was beyond saving, thereby eliminating
the legal need to save any old-growth forest. Second, the injunc-
tions and the litigation as a whole turned public and Congressional
attention to the efforts to save both the owl and old-growth forests.
2. Action Under the Endangered Species Act
a. The Listing Litigation
In 1987, the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") responded to
a petition requesting that the owl be listed as endangered. 0 6 In the
administrative review that followed, the FWS determined that
there was insufficient data to support a finding that the owl was
endangered. 207 By November 1988, however, the federal District
Court held that this administrative decision was arbitrary and ca-
pricious. 208 Judge Zilly's opinion stated, "the Service disregarded
all the expert opinion on population viability, including that of its
own expert, that the owl is facing extinction, and instead merely
asserted its own expertise in support of its conclusions. '"20 9 The
administrative record on which the FWS's decision was based
showed overwhelming agreement among spotted owl and popula-
tion biology experts that the owl was in danger of extinction. 210
Consequently, the court ordered the FWS to: (1) provide an anal-
ysis and explanation for its finding that the owl was not endan-
gered, (2) explain its failure to list the owl as threatened, and
(3) supplement its status review and petition finding.21I The FWS
206. See SPOTTED OWL PETITION BESET BY PROBLEMS, supra note 96, at 1.
207. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Finding on Northern Spotted
Owl Petition, 52 Fed. Reg. 48,552, 48,554 (1987) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17). The
agency failed to address the issue of whether the owl qualified as threatened. See Northern
Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 481 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
208. Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. at 483.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 481-83.
211. Id. at 483.
Beyond the Spotted Owl
subsequently reversed its position in April 1989, finding that the
owl was threatened.212
b. The Interagency Scientific Committee
Soon after the proposed listing of the owl as a threatened
species, the Bush Administration established an Interagency Sci-
entific Committee ("ISC") under the authority of an agreement
among the Forest Service, BLM, FWS, and National Park Ser-
vice.213 The ISC was chartered to develop a "scientifically credible
conservation strategy for the northern spotted owl. '214 The ISC,
also known as the Thomas Committee for its chair, Jack Ward
Thomas, undertook a detailed survey of all available information
on the owl. It prepared a comprehensive report that explained the
owl's status and provided detailed recommendations for ensuring
the survival of the species. 215
In outlining its strategy, the Committee emphasized that its
deliberations took into account the human impact of its proposals,
and did not set out to construct a plan that demanded absolute
protection for the owls. 21 6 It sought to engineer a compromise that
gave human economic activity the benefit of every doubt, consis-
tent with the biological needs of the owl. 21 7 This accommodation
reflected both the political climate and the specific mandate given
the Committee to minimize economic loss. The Committee's final
212. This finding resulted in a rule listing the northern spotted owl as threatened on
June 26, 1990. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threat-
ened Status for the Northern Spotted Owl, 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (1990) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. § 17).
213. See ISC REPORT, supra note 16, 46 app. A at 47-49.
214. Id. at 1.
215. See id. at 1.
216. The Committee wrote:
A strategy that has any chance of adoption in the short term and any chance
of success in the long term must include consideration of human needs and
desires. To ignore the human condition in conservation strategies is to fail. We
have searched for a way to assure the continuing viability of the owl that still
allows continuation of some substantial cutting of mature and old-growth
forests.
Id. at9.
217. Asked by congressional representatives if the report could be compromised,
Thomas reportedly replied, "We are already dooming up to half the owls.., this is as fine
a line as we can cut-there's no more room for a deal to be made." DIETRICH, supra note
26, at 227-28.
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report recommended that 7.7 million acres be set aside as habitat
areas for the owl,2 18 about 3 million of which could otherwise have
been subject to logging. 219 The Committee reported its belief that
this was a compromise that would allow the owl population to
decline forty to fifty percent over the next century before it
stabilized.22 0
Many have widely praised the ISC Report as a thorough and
balanced study. Even those who find its recommendations unac-
ceptable have not attacked the report's credibility, but have
pointed out the shortcomings of the compromise chosen by its
authors. 221 Some have hailed it as a "textbook" standard for sci-
entific contributions to policymaking because of its strong scientific
underpinnings and its straightforward handling of both scientific
and policy questions. 22
Nonetheless, the strategy produced by the ISC failed to com-
port with the Administration's objectives and the Administration
attacked it for the enormous social costs it imposed simply to save
the spotted owl.223 The Administration appointed a cabinet-level
task force to propose an alternative course of action that would
be less dramatic, both economically and socially.2 24 The task force,
headed by Secretary of Commerce Clayton Yeutter, produced no
meaningful alternative.22
The Administration also reportedly asked some government
scientists to review the Thomas Report for the purpose of discred-
218. ISC REPORT, supra note 16, 314 app. Q at 343.
219. See Richard Siegel, Will the Winner be Owls or Jobs?, WASH. TIMEs, Sept. 4,
1990, at C4. The harvest levels allowed by the ISC Report would produce 2.6 billion board
feet of wood down from 3.85 billion authorized by Congress. See David Schaefer & Keith
Ervin, Owl Plan Would OK More Logging, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 21, 1990, at Al.
220. See ISC REPORT, supra note 16, at 4-5; David Schaefer, Owl Plan Could Cut
Log Harvest by 30%-Peninsula Would Be Wracked, Says Swift, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 5,
1990, at D1.
221. See David Schaefer, Blow to NW Timber Industry-Spotted Owl Study Calls
for Saving Vast Tracts of Trees, SEATTLE TIMEs, Apr. 4, 1990, at Al.
222. DIETRICH, supra note 26, at 225.
223. See Schaefer & Ervin, supra note 219 (administration proposal would allow 0.6
bbf more timber to be cut); David Schaefer, Bush to Propose Logging Cutback, Senator
Says, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 15, 1990, at AlO.
224. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1090 (W.D. Wash.
1991) (quoting Dr. Thomas from preliminary injunction hearing). See also Kenworthy,
supra note 104.
225. See Kenworthy, supra note 104. The task force did produce a three page press
release urging Congress to mandate that 3.5 bbf of timber be cut in national forests in the
Pacific Northwest and to insulate these sales from environmental laws. Id.
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iting it.2 26 Reports surfaced of Administration efforts to prevent
Forest Service employees from disclosing facts viewed as unfa-
vorable to the Administration's pro-industry position.227 When the
unimpeachable credibility of the Thomas Report228 defeated Ad-
ministration efforts to back away from its recommendations, the
Forest Service informally promised to act "not inconsistently" with
the Report. 229 However, the Service notably failed to take any
steps that would implement this promise. It continued to rely on
its 1988 management guidelines and failed to undertake the actions
necessary to develop a new plan.230 BLM also agreed informally
to comply with parts of the ISC strategy, although it refused to
adopt them in full.2 3'
As public pressure to protect the owl and orders from the
ongoing litigation forced the agencies to slow or halt their sales in
potential owl habitat, the Administration continued to search for
"solutions" to the controversy other than those provided by the
statutes. On September 11, 1991, BLM petitioned for an exemption
from the requirements of the ESA under section 7(h) of the statute
to allow it to proceed with forty-four old-growth timber sales
notwithstanding the owl's status.232 Secretary Lujan convened the
Endangered Species Committee despite BLM's noncompliance
with NEPA and its failure to first consult with the FWS on the
issue.233 In May 1992, Lujan announced that the Committee had
226. See DiETRICH, supra note 26, at 224.
227. See Bill Dietrich, Bush Blocked Loggers' Aid, Unsoeld Says-Owl Relief Pro-
posal Squelched, SEATrLE TIMES, May 4, 1991, at Al.
228. In addition to the broad inclusive socio-political perspective that Thomas
brought to the Committee, his lack of prior interest in or connection to the owl also
buttressed his public credibility as an impartial leader. See DiETRICH, supra note 26, at
226-27.
229. See 55 Fed. Reg. 40,412, 40,413 (Oct. 3, 1990).
230. See, e.g., the discussion of Forest Service actions which the agency asserted
were not inconsistent with the ISC strategy, in Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 1991
WL 180099, at *7--*8 (W.D. Wash. March 7, 1991) (rejecting Forest Service argument that
compliance with ESA vitiates agency's duties to comply' with NFMA viability
requirements).
231. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 795 F. Supp. 1489, 1494 (D. Or. 1992).
In separate litigation, the district court enjoined BLM's piecemeal implementation of the
ISC plan, a plan known as the "Jamison Strategy," because of BLM's failure to consult
with the FWS as required by the ESA. See Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20050 (D. Or. Sept. 11, 1991), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 958 F.2d
290 (9th Cir. 1992).
232. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h).
233. Environmental groups challenged the resulting exemption decision on several
grounds, including BLM's failure to consult with FWS prior to seeking an exemption, its
noncompliance with NEPA, and ex parte communications between the White House and
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voted five-to-two in favor of exempting thirteen of the forty-four
BLM sales from the statute's requirements. 23 4
c. Critical Habitat Designation and Development of a
Recovery Plan under the ESA
Meanwhile, plaintiffs' success in having the owl listed under
the ESA was set back by both the FWS's final rule listing the owl
as threatened instead of endangered and its finding that critical
habitat was not presently determinable. 2 5 However, plaintiffs in
the listing litigation successfully moved to require the FWS to
designate critical habitat for the ow1. 23 6 The court cited strong
evidence in the legislative history that Congress intended desig-
nation of critical habitat to coincide with a final listing decision
"absent extraordinary circumstances. '237 On this basis, it ordered
the FWS to prepare a plan for completing its review of critical
habitat by March 15, 1991 and a proposed critical habitat desig-
nation within forty-five days thereafter.238
Under the ESA, economics as well as the needs of the species
are relevant in a critical habitat determination.23 9 However, the
FWS's designation of critical habitat for the spotted owl relied
most heavily on scientific data about the owl, 240 and minimally on
the Committee regarding the petition. In Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species
Committee, 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit ruled that ex parte communi-
cations would be unlawful and that the record for review of the Committee's decision must
include all materials on which the Committee relied. The Court remanded to an adminis-
trative law judge for a hearing on the issue of alleged ex parte contacts. Id. at *2-*3.
234. Endangered Species Committee, Notice of Decision, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,405 (June
3, 1992). See Keith Schneider, White House on Conflicting Paths as It Agrees to Protection
for Owl, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1992, at Al.
235. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, "Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and
Plants; Determination of Threatened Status for the Northern Spotted Owl," 55 Fed. Reg.
26,114 (June 26, 1990).
236. Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
237. Id. at 626.
238. Id. at 629. The court found no evidence in the proposed or final listing decisions
that the FWS had even attempted to determine critical habitat. Id. at 627.
239. See supra notes 85-105 and accompanying text.
240. See Yagerman, supra note 4, at 853 (quoting WALTER A. ROSENBAUM, ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY 83 (1985)) ("As a matter of practical politics.., solving
an issue by resort to credible scientific evidence can spare officials controversy and criticism
they might otherwise endure-sometimes science alone legitimates policies.").
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economic considerations.2 41 The FWS designated approximately
6.9 million acres for critical habitat. 242 The FWS prepared a re-
covery plan as required under section 4(f) of the ESA.2 43
On May 14, 1992, the Spotted Owl Recovery Team244 pro-
posed a plan to protect 7.5 million acres. 245 However, on the same
day, the Secretary of the Interior also announced an alternative
termed a "preservation plan. 2 46 Contradicting ESA's mandate, the
plan sought to promote a further compromise between saving the
owl and saving the projected 30,000 jobs that would be lost under
the recovery plan. Lujan's preservation plan, dubbed "the extinc-
tion plan" by environmental interests,2 47 was a simple arithmetic
reduction of the recovery plan: it would preserve half the area
needed for the owl to survive, and would therefore "cost" half as
many "jobs. 2 48 The flaw, of course, was that there was no legal
authority or ecological basis for adopting such a plan.2 49 Moreover,
Secretary Lujan acknowledged that under his alternative plan the
owl had a fifty percent probability of extinction in the next hundred
241. See M.L. SCHAUMBERGER ET AL., U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATION EFFECTS FOR THE NORTHERN SPOT-
TED OWL (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]. The result of the economic
analysis and the exclusion process was to exclude 3 million acres of private lands, 580,000
acres of state-owned lands, 74,000 acres of Tribal lands, all sold but unharvested timber
on federal lands, and 865,000 additional acres, some of which represented land mistakenly
included in the initial legal descriptions, and some of which was to reduce economic
impacts. The primary reason for excluding the first three categories of land was the limited
benefit to be gained from designation in light of the limited federal control. See BARRY S.
MULDER ET AL., EXCLUSION PROCESS: CRITICAL HABITAT AND THE NORTHERN SPOTTED
OWL 12, 24-25 erroneously printed in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra.
242. See CRITICAL HABITAT FOR THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL, supra note 7, at
38. This designation has been challenged based on FWS's failure to prepare an EIS on the
designation. Douglas County v. Lujan, 1992 WL 420811 (D. Or. Dec. 22, 1992).
243. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f).
244. Secretary Lujan appointed an interdisciplinary Recovery Team to develop the
Recovery Plan for the spotted owl mandated under § 4(f) of the ESA. See U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF THE INTERIOR, RECOVERY PLAN FOR THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OwL-DRAFT,
app. K at 639 (Apr. 1992).
245. See id.
246. See Terry Atlas, Owls Lose a Habitat Battle, CHI. TRIB., May 15, 1992, at 1.
247. Tom Kenworthy, Logging Approved at Owl Site, WASH. POST, May 15, 1992,
Al, A14.
248. Atlas, supra note 246, at A8.
249. Senator Slade Gorton has introduced legislation that would mandate implemen-
tation of the "Preservation Plan" and suspend the operation of the ESA, NEPA, the
FLPMA, the OCLA, the RPA, and the MBTA to the extent that the plan conflicts with
their mandates. S. 2762, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Senate Committee hearings on the
bill concluded in August 1992.
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years,250 a result completely inconsistent with the premises of the
ESA.
On the same day, Lujan announced the exemption of the
thirteen BLM sales. 251 The Administration and Secretary Lujan
also called for Congress to amend the ESA.252
Although the controversy over the old-growth forests and the
owl is still far from over, the ESA has played a central role.
Plaintiffs' success under the ESA ultimately catalyzed the impor-
tant work of the ISC and the Recovery Team, and required the
designation of critical habitat for the owl, the most important
concrete measures thus far in the ongoing struggle to preserve
forests. The listing also attracted national attention to the case by
narrowing the debate to a set of issues with popular appeal. The
owl's listing activated the ESA provisions requiring BLM and the
Forest Service to consult with the FWS, a significant practical
constraint protecting the owl and its critical habitat from jeopardy
or adverse modification. 253 Of all the applicable statutes, the ESA
was the most effective in achieving protection of the owl and the
forest.
C. Some Observations on the Controversy: Law, Values,
Politics, and the Spotted Owl
The spotted owl controversy provides a valuable opportunity
to examine the role our laws play in resolving the social conflict
between resource protection and economic activity. This Section
focuses on two features of the controversy that shed light on how
the laws operated in the dispute: (1) the legal battle's narrow focus
on the spotted owl and its status under the ESA; and (2) the
hostility and opposition to the ESA that the controversy has gen-
erated. Part IV will build on these observations in exploring what
we can learn from the controversy.
250. Atlas, supra note 246.
251. See supra notes 232-234 and accompanying text.
252. Schneider, supra note 234, at BS.
253. See Daugherty, supra note 95, however, for a detailed discussion of the limited
impact of the consultation process on BLM's and the Forest Service's actions.
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1. Why the Owl? The Role of the Endangered Species Act
Perhaps the most striking fact that emerges from the old-
growth controversy is the degree to which the spotted owl has
dominated the dispute. This is partly due to the attraction of a
single symbol to simplify complex issues. Yet the focus on the owl
is more than mere convenience. The statutes and policies that
have framed the dispute demand the owl's prominence. American
resource protection law ensured that the most effective, if not the
only, strategy for challenging the management of old-growth forest
on publicly-owned lands was to rely on a species as a surrogate
for a broader range of values. 254 The resultant transformation of a
broad, polycentric controversy into a fight pitting a single species
against entrenched economic and other human interests inevitably
produced narrow decisions failing to address important root causes
of the controversy.
The broad discretion forest management statutes afford the
Forest Service and BLM also helps explain the public indifference
to the old-growth controversy until the discovery of the spotted
owl. While a vast improvement over prior law,255 reflecting a shift
in American values toward preservation of natural resources and
their non-economic value,256 the NFMA creates a deliberative pub-
lic planning process for the national forests without imposing spe-
cific enforceable standards. The regulations implementing the
NFMA follow this pattern. Ecological integrity,2 57 native ecosys-
tems,258 and the benefits of old-growth forests259 are among the
254. See supra note 39. In many cases, plaintiffs have openly acknowledged that the
species is a surrogate for larger natural resource values that are not afforded direct protec-
tion elsewhere under our laws. See, e.g., Plater, In the Wake, supra note 97 (citizens'
reliance on snail darter and ESA was part of larger effort to stop Tellico dam project in
order to preserve Little Tennessee River); see also Ike Sugg, God Squad to the Rescue:
Cutting Through Fraud, WASH. TIMES, May 22, 1992, at F1 (reporting comment of Oregon
Natural Resources Council's Andy Stahl on use of owl to protect forest).
255. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra notes 11, at 371-73.
256. "The American people have spoken out, and the message is loud and clear-
fish, wildlife, wilderness, recreation ... are important." Forest Service Associate Chief
George M. Leonard, testifying before the House Agriculture Committee, reported in David
S. Cloud, Special Report: In Battle Over Forest Land, Ecologists Gaining Ground, CONG.
Q. 171, 172 (Jan. 20, 1990).
257. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.1(b) (mandating that forest planning be based on series of
principles).
258. See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § 219.27(g) (setting forth minimum management requirement
for Forest Service plans).
259. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(A) (1988) (requiring guidelines that will protect forest
resources for wilderness, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish); 36 C.F.R. § 219.27(a),(d),
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values articulated under the statute and regulations, but with al-
most no enforceable standards. The vast majority of the duties in
the regulations regarding protection of natural resources are lim-
ited or qualified by phrases such as "to the degree consistent with
multiple-use objectives. '26°
The regulation under which the plaintiffs in Seattle Audubon
Society successfully asserted a claim, the viability regulation, is
one of the strongest standards of ecological protection under the
NFMA.261 However, the viability regulation is a narrow command,
applying only at the species level and focusing on vertebrate pop-
ulations. 262 Like the ESA, it becomes enforceable only when a
species approaches an extreme ecological threshold; until a threat
to a species' viability is scientifically established, its mandate is of
no force.
The limitations of the FLPMA mirror those of the NFMA.
Like the NFMA, the FLPMA mandates a multiple use and sus-
tained yield policy,263 but fails to impose any ecological or eco-
nomic constraints on the BLM. If the agency engages in rational
and thorough consideration of the needs of the American public
and concludes that old-growth forest is needed principally as tim-
ber, any challenge to the agency's decision would be an uphill
battle. 264
The institutional histories of the Forest Service and BLM also
help explain the failure of the NFMA and FLPMA standards to
provide a basis for protecting the old-growth ecosystem. The post-
& (e) (setting out general statements of minimum management requirements regarding,
inter alia, conservation of soil and water resources).
260. E.g., 36 C.F.R. § 219.26 ("planning shall provide for diversity of plant and
animal communities and tree species consistent with the overall multiple-use objectives of
the planning area" (emphasis added)); Keiter, supra note 4, at 1000 (describing discretionary
management authority as two-edged sword that has not been used effectively to date to
integrate principles of ecosystem management into public land governance); see also 36
C.F.R. § 219.27(a)(3),(5),(6), & (7).
261. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
262. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(1).
263. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c).
264. The plaintiff in such a case bears the burden of proving that a BLM decision
was arbitrary or capricious because, for example, non-economic values or interests of
future generations were impermissibly undervalued. Meeting such a burden is a difficult
task. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. Cf. Oregon Natural Resources Council
v. Mohla, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,117 (D. Or. May 25, 1989), aff'd, 895 F.2d
627 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1990), discussed supra note 181. This may
explain why the plaintiffs' FLPMA claim in the Portland litigation was so narrowly tailored.
Plaintiffs focused on BLM's failure in its Forest Resource Policy Statement to provide for
withdrawal from logging of lands that might be suitable for owl habitat. See 1991 WL 81838
at *4.
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World War II history of timber primacy and the Forest Service's
continued belief in its mission to produce timber have been well
documented. 265 By giving the Forest Service the discretion to re-
solve conflicting interests, Congress virtually assured that envi-
ronmental interests would be shortchanged, 266 even with the Forest
Service acting in good faith. Since courts afford agency decisions
considerable deference2 67 and do not take into account the fact
that the agency's priorities have historically veered towards timber
to a degree inconsistent with existing law,268 challenges aimed
merely at the balance struck by the agency between conflicting
values or the inadequate degree of environmental value protection
rarely succeed. 269
265. See, e.g., DAVID A. CLARY, TIMBER AND THE FOREST SERVICE 41 (1986);
WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 372; Wilkinson, supra note 27, at 15-20;
Michael C. Blumm, Ancient Forests, Spotted Owls, and Modern Public Land Law, 18 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 605, 620 (1991).
Signs of an evolution in Forest Service values have emerged. See Holmes Rolston
III & James Coufal, A Forest Ethic and Multivalue Forest Management, J. FORESTRY 35,
37 (Apr. 1991) (noting need for amendment to Society of American Foresters' Code of
Ethics and several signs of such change, including rapid growth of Association of Forest
Service Employees for Environmental Ethics and statement by Forest Service Chief Rob-
ertson annnouncing new national policy recognizing "the many significant values associated
with old-growth forests"). See also Tom Kenworthy, Forest Service Chief Orders "Ecolog-
ical Approach" to Managing U.S. Woodlands, WASH. POST., June 4, 1992, at All (an-
nouncing new program of ecosystem management and reduction in clearcutting).
266. See Keiter, supra note 4, at 997, who notes the Forest Service's tendency not
to make resource allocation decisions in the forest plans in order to preserve greater
managerial flexibility. While acknowledging the value of discretion, Keiter notes that "flex-
ibility can-as it has in the past-become a guise for politically expedient, rather than
principled, ecologically sound decisions." Id. Keiter describes attempts of forest adminis-
trators seeking to retain discretion on significant issues even when this inhibits ongoing
efforts to coordinate with other agencies for better ecosystem management. Id. at 994-95.
267. See Resources Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 789 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Mont. 1991).
268. Forest Service discretion is not the only factor. Also important is Congress's
role in pushing the Forest Service to higher harvest levels than the agency recommended
in recent years. The fragmented manner in which Congress considers timber issues-in
appropriations, agency policy, and public land management-has created considerable
problems. See Cloud, supra note 256, at 172.
269. See, e.g. Citizens for Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 970, 983
(D. Colo. 1989); see also Keiter, supra note 4, at 964-65; F. Kaid Benfield, The Adminis-
trative Record and the Range of Alternatives in National Forest Planning: Applicable
Standards and Inconsistent Approaches, 17 ENVTL. L. 371 (1987); Paul J. Culhane, NEPA's
Effect on Agency Decision Making, 20 ENVTL. L. 681, 695-702 (noting similarity between
NEPA and the NFMA in emphasis placed on rationalist analysis rather than strong sub-
stantive standards to guide agency decisions on highly political issues).
The recent proposed rule aimed at restricting the public's opportunity to appeal
Forest Service decisions seeks to shift the balance further in favor of agency discretion. It
characterizes many appeals as "rooted in differing views about the priorities and values
assigned to the agency's many wide-ranging and legislatively-mandated multiple-use man-
agement objectives." U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Review of and Comment on National
Forest Plans and Project Decisions, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,444, 10,445 (Mar. 26, 1992). In the
Forest Service's view, any priorities that differ from the -agency's should only be offered
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NEPA, too, has been of limited value in framing and address-
ing the old-growth controversy. NEPA does not provide standards
against which to measure the substantive policies pursued by BLM
or the impact of these policies on the biodiversity and health of
old-growth ecosystems. Rather, it simply requires BLM formally
to document its awareness of new information about the owl. 270
The net result of this array of legal constraints is that the
species viability mandates of the ESA and the NFMA regulations
provided the first effective check on a pattern of economic activity
which entailed known long-term, detrimental environmental and
economic consequences. Of course, enforcement of these laws
with respect to old growth was profoundly shaped by Congress's
ongoing oversight of public forest management and the use of
annual appropriation riders to set harvest levels and restrict the
application of forest management laws. Thus, criticism of the op-
eration of the laws in the old-growth controversy is directed not
only at the weakness of the policies embodied in current laws, but
at Congress's widely criticized use of the appropriation riders to
distort extant political and judicial processes. 27'
Public choice theory in its starkest form offers a plausible if
over-simplified explanation for this history of congressional action
and Congress's support for the riders in the case of old-growth
forests and the owl.272 Historically, legislation affecting particular
geographic areas has been dominated by the views of legislators
representing the area. Thus, one could expect that relatively well-
organized and concentrated economic interests supporting high
timber harvest levels in the Pacific Northwest would influence key
legislators, such as Senators Hatfield and Packwood, to support
high harvest levels. One can explain both the absence of meaning-
by the public before the agency's decision; appeal of resulting decisions should not be
allowed. Id. at 10,446.
270. I do not mean to dismiss the importance of the obligation recognized by the
Stryker's Bay decision, 444 U.S. 223 (1980), discussed supra note 130 and accompanying
text. The court upheld NEPA's goal that federal actors engage in reasoned consideration
of environmental consequences before acting. But because NEPA does not require selection
of any particular course of action, nor even conformity to any set of priorities, it does not
provide an effective vehicle for challenging substantive policies. See Michael C. Blumm,
The National Environmental Policy Act at Twenty: A Preface, 20 ENVTL. L. 447 (1990);
Nicholas C. Yost, NEPA's Promise-Partially Fulfilled, 20 ENVTL. L. 533 (1990).
271. See generally Blumm, supra note 203; Sher & Hunting, supra note 180; Bolduan,
supra note 180.
272. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873 (1987) for an overview of the theory and its application to
law. I am indebted to Michael Blumm for pointing out the importance of the local-national
dynamic in public land law and its consistency with public choice theory.
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ful constraints in the organic forest management statutes, and the
riders setting unsustainable annual harvest levels, as favoring these
local private interests over the more diffuse national public inter-
est.273 Only when environmental groups were able to capture na-
tional public attention through media coverage about the owl was
the lobbying pressure created by these "local" economic interests
neutralized. 4
Professors Farber and Frickey offer a weaker version of the
economic theory of legislation acknowledging the role of reelec-
tion-and hence of constituent and contributor interests-in de-
termining legislative action, and recognizing that small easily-or-
ganized interest groups have a disproportionate influence. 275 This
weaker theory may explain Congress's actions in the old-growth
controversy equally well. When Congress views the issues as only
regionally significant, all those involved can best advance their
own reelection prospects by a general rule of deference to the
representatives from a region on issues of great regional impor-
tance. Such deference to legislators from the Northwest could
explain the statutory backdrop underlying this controversy. 276
The national prominence that the case achieved due to the
injunctions and the popular interest in the owl may have changed
the legislative balance significantly. 277 Once the debate took into
account the consequences for the entire country of the annual
timber harvest levels and the appropriation riders, Congress ended
its deference to Senator Hatfield in his efforts to obtain a new
rider in 1991.278 This refusal reflected the diluted impact of the
273. See Blumm, supra note 203, at 51-55.
274. As public awareness spread from the affected communities to a national audi-
ence, the focus of attention widened from the owl to the forest as well. The debate has
expanded to include old-growth forests, ecosystem preservation, public land management,
timber harvesting practices, export of raw logs, automation and relocation of the logging,
pulp and paper industries, and the economy of the Pacific Northwest. See infra notes 366-
367. See also Farber & Frickey, supra note 272, at 887 (noting that interest group pressure
is likely to be strongest when group's goals are narrow and address low-visibility issues).
275. Id. at 900.
276. Under this system of deference, the regional representatives could then advance
the interests of the powerful, concentrated, and organized Pacific Northwest constituents,
both human and corporate. As a result, human constituents would reward the local dele-
gation with votes and institutions would contribute endorsements and financial support.
These representatives would then reward other legislators with comparable deference on
issues of importance to their respective constituencies.
277. When representatives from outside the region thus became accountable to their
own constituents for their positions on old growth and the spotted owl, they were more
likely to address the merits of the old-growth debate in order to advance their possibilities
for reelection instead of simply deferring to the Northwestern congressional delegates.
278. See supra note 205.
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regionally-powerful timber-aligned interests once the debate be-
came significant to voters nationwide.2 79
2. The Spotted Owl and the Future of the ESA
The record of the litigation reveals that the statutes have been
themselves targets of strong political forces during the contro-
versy. While the statutes and their standards played a principal
role in shaping the conflict, the dispute also has led to important
changes in and deviations from the norms and standards embodied
in the laws.
The pattern of responses to the spotted owl litigation dem-
onstrates a serious dissatisfaction with our current laws, at least
among some groups, and reveals the existence of an ongoing as-
sault on important environmental protections. 280 A study of the
pervasive efforts to end-run the protections of the ESA and other
laws in the case of the owl and the similarity of the owl debate to
the history of the Tellico dam controversy suggest that this assault
should not be taken lightly.
Against a proven backdrop of agency resistance to and non-
compliance with the mandates of the statutes, between 1988 and
1990, Congress adopted several riders to appropriation measures
which undermined the modest protections afforded by the planning
processes mandated by the NFMA, the FLPMA, and NEPA.281 In
restricting judicial review of BLM and Forest Service management
plans, Congress sought to dismiss legitimate challenges to plan-
ning, which were misperceived as illegitimate or frivolous when
compared with the serious impact of delays on timber sales.282 The
riders embodied substantive law in violation of House and Senate
Rules, and their adoption represented a subversion of the delib-
erative legislative process by a few powerful members of
Congress .283
279. Accepting these economic theories as one explanation for Congressional action
is not inconsistent with a recognition that the appropriation riders represented a failure of
the deliberative legislative process.
280. See Economic Issues to Be 'Prevailing Factor' in Battle over [ESA] Reauthor-
ization, Hatfield Says, Current Developments, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 2080 (Dec.
18, 1992).
281. See supra notes 180-205 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 198-199 and accompanying text.
283. See Blumm, supra note 203, at 52-56.
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The Administration initially sought to avoid enforcement of
the ESA by convening the ISC, but when the Administration found
the ISC report unsatisfactory, it sought to discredit the report.284
Although BLM and the Forest Service publicly agreed to comply
informally with its terms, they failed to implement its requirements
and sought unsuccessfully to use the Thomas Report in the ongoing
litigation as a shield from other statutory requirements.28 5 When
these efforts to avoid the application of the ESA failed, BLM
sought an exemption under section 7 of the ESA in order to
proceed with 44 timber sales without ESA compliance. Through-
out, the Administration and the timber industry called for amend-
ment of the ESA. Additionally, as part of the Quayle Council's
initiatives, 286 the Department of Agriculture subsequently pro-
posed rules that would restrict appeals of national forest manage-
ment decisions. 287
Although some may dismiss this history as representing tem-
porary dissatisfaction with the outcome of the litigation, the Tellico
dam controversy serves as a reminder that such efforts may seri-
ously threaten the viability of the ESA. 288 The Tellico dam was a
Tennessee Valley Authority project seen as a means of revitalizing
a flagging agency,289 and as a tool for local politicians to enhance
power and profit.290 Many citizens opposed the dam project for a
number of different reasons, 291 but were unable to halt the project
in a meaningful way until the ESA was passed in 1973.292
284. See supra notes 226-231 and accompanying text.
285. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 1991 WL 180099 at *5-*7 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 7, 1991), aff'd in part, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting Forest Service's
arguments that its promise to act not inconsistently with ISC Report constituted compliance
with ESA and relieved it of duty to comply with NEPA and the NFMA); see also supra
note 231.
286. The White House Council on Competitiveness, commonly known as the Quayle
Council for Vice President Quayle's role as its chair, became well-known for initiatives to
reduce regulation of industry. See Jim Sibbison, Industry's Backdoor Boy, THE NATION
141 (July 29/Aug. 5, 1991).
287. See supra note 269.
288. For a full discussion of the history of the Tellico dam controversy, see Plater,
In the Wake, supra note 97.
289. See id. at 856.
290. See id. at 856 n.42.
291. Id. at 809-10. Some of these reasons included flooding of farms, loss of recre-
ational flowing rivers, invasion of a sacred Cherokee site, and economic waste already
known to be involved in the project.
292. The citizens used NEPA to obtain an injunction that halted construction for
two years. But the project resumed once the TVA prepared an impact statement. See id.
at 810-11.
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After the ESA's passage and the discovery of the snail darter
in the portion of the Little Tennessee that would be flooded by the
dam, 293 citizens seized the ESA's protection and carried forward
their challenge in the name of the snail darter.294 They obtained an
injunction from the Sixth Circuit to halt the dam, and thereby
sparked new pressure in opposition to the ESA.2 95 As in the spotted
owl dispute, opponents of the ESA emphasized the apparent dis-
proportionality of blocking a multi-million-dollar dam project for
a two-and-a-half-inch fish. 296 Those supporting the dam finally
managed to end-run the ESA by amending the statute and pursuing
an exemption for the dam.297
The histories of the snail darter and owl controversies and the
pattern of end-runs in the two cases are surprisingly similar.298 In
both cases, statutes authorizing the dam and the old-growth har-
vesting, respectively, contained no enforceable mandates for pro-
tection of public environmental values, leaving the ESA and a
single species' extinction as the only operative constraints. Each
controversy shows a clear pattern of efforts to temporarily disable
and permanently weaken laws, including the ESA. The sense that
plaintiffs were motivated by other than the nominal species also
fueled the opposition in each case, leading to assertions that those
championing the owl's or snail darter's cause were using the ESA
as a surrogate to accomplish a hidden, vaguely subversive
agenda.299
A broader perspective on the old-growth controversy dem-
onstrates that the efforts to weaken environmental statutes are
293. See id. at 811.
294. After a year's effort culminated in an endangered listing for the snail darter, see
40 Fed. Reg. 47,505 (1975), the citizens challenged the dam construction under section 7
of the ESA. See Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd, 549 F.2d 1064
(6th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
295. See Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), aff'd 437
U.S. 153 (1978).
296. See Plater, In the Wake, supra note 97, at 849 and n.169. Plater notes that the
commmonly cited $150 million figure associated with the dam was incorrect. Id.
297. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text. Ironically, the dam failed utterly
to pass the economic threshold required for exemption. This led to the second and final
end-run: Senator Baker fashioned an appropriations rider authorizing completion of the
dam notwithstanding the ESA. See Plater, In the Wake, supra note 97, at n.32. Apparently
most of the Congress which passed the appropriations bill had no knowledge of the dam
rider. See id.; see also Sher & Hunting, supra note 180, at 442-44.
298. See Jay Heinrichs, The Winged Snail Darter, 81 J. FORESTRY 212 (1983).
299. See Sugg, supra note 254. See also Plater, In the Wake, supra note 97, at 850;
Salzman, supra note 91, at 319.
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misguided. Only if the spotted owl and the ESA are the root causes
of our problems would their removal solve our difficulties and
prevent similar conflicts in the future.
IV. LEARNING FROM THE OLD-GROWTH CONTROVERSY
How well the legal system has served the public interest in
the old-growth controversy has been the subject of considerable
debate in recent months. 300 Blunt commands have halted economic
activity; communities and a regional economy are changing irrev-
ocably. Those affected have often felt, however erroneously, that
their interests are not even considered, much less given appropri-
ate weight under the current laws.
This Part will explore the lessons to be learned from the old-
growth controversy. Section A looks critically at the lesson that
many, including former-President Bush, have drawn from the con-
troversy: that the ESA and the owl are problems interfering with
necessary and beneficial economic activity. The Section then ex-
plores the weaknesses of arguments offered in support of measures
to eliminate these "problems." Section B presents an alternative
set of lessons from the controversy, based on a broader view of
the underlying problem, and emphasizes the ways in which our
laws and recent actions by Congress contributed to the creation
of the phenomenon that has been misnamed the "spotted owl
problem."
A. The Spotted Owl Fallacy
All across the country we have a spotted owl problem. And
yes, we want to see that little furry-feathery guy protected and
all of that.
-President George Bush301
300. President Bush, for instance, took campaign positions on legal changes needed
in the wake of the litigation. See Michael Wines, Bush, In Far West, Sides With Loggers,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1992, at A25. President Clinton convened and attended a "timber
summit" focused in part on these issues. See supra note 5.
301. Excerpted Remarks with Community Leaders in Portsmouth, N.H., 28 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 92, 96 (Jan. 15, 1992).
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How we respond to the old-growth controversy will depend
on our perception of the "problem." Some view the spotted owl
as merely the messenger of bad news. To others, however, the
lesson is that we have a "spotted owl problem" and the facile
"solution" is to weaken environmental protection laws and reduce
public participation in land management decisions. In fact, these
political efforts to eliminate the "spotted owl problem" may be a
cynical attempt to use the dissatisfaction that the controversy has
produced to eviscerate the ESA.
The source of the perception that we have a "spotted owl
problem" is not hard to identify. The most publicized basis for
preserving old growth and for sustaining plaintiffs' challenges to
federally subsidized economic activity has been the survival of the
owl, only one of many species known to exist there.302 Proponents
of logging have used that publicity to argue that the short-term
costs associated with protecting the old growth are caused by the
species and concern for its survival.30 3 Yet close examination of
these arguments reveals the distorted view of the old-growth con-
flict and the environmental laws on which the arguments rest.
In the wake of the owl controversy, many have argued that
the ESA is excessively costly.3°4 Those who claim protecting the
owl is "uneconomical" may add up the jobs lost on one side and
the owls saved on the other. But this calculus ignores the inevitable
loss of old growth-dependent timber jobs when the last old growth
is cut, 30 5 the broader economic issues surrounding logging on pub-
lic lands, 30 6 and the impacts of automation and the export of raw
logs. 307 This view also underestimates the values advanced by
preservation of the old-growth ecosystem, ranging from watershed
and wildlife protection to enhanced recreation, hunting, fishing,
and other non-economic values of the forests. 30 8 Further, this view
assumes the absolute substitutability of resources, an assumption
302. The reasons for the owl's prominence are discussed supra part III.C.1.
303. See Bolduan, supra note 180, at 362-65 (documenting Congress's explicit jus-
tification for riders as necessary response to short-term harm that communities might suffer
from enforcement of laws).
304. See, e.g., Wines, supra note 300 (quoting President Bush as saying that "the
balance has been lost" between economics and environmental needs).
305. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 13-15, 61-73 and accompanying text.
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that not only may be wrong,3 9 but may undervalue the interests
of future generations in finite natural resources. In a word, it
requires that we define "economics" in a narrow, ultimately mean-
ingless fashion. 310
The ethical argument that we need to value people over owls 31'
suffers from the same fatal constriction of focus, ignoring the far
broader implications of preserving the owl. Any debate about the
long-term human values312 embodied in the ESA must also include
the values that motivate species preservation.
Another criticism of the ESA that surfaced in the owl contro-
versy is the asserted "extremism" of the statute.313 This increas-
ingly common characterization of the ESA is simply inaccurate.
The ESA is far from absolute. 31 4 The Act imposes no serious
constraints on purely private action. 31 5 Section 7(h) gives the Ad-
ministration, through the Endangered Species Committee, explicit
authority to allow economic activity to continue in cases of re-
309. See PAUL R. ERLICH & JONATHAN ROUGHGARDEN, THE SCIENCE OF ECOLOGY
606-07 (1987); Dold, supra note 15 (reporting study demonstrating reduction in biological
diversity in old-growth areas that had regenerated after clearcutting).
310. See infra part IV.B.4.
311. See Wines, supra note 300, (quoting President Bush in a campaign speech,
saying "It's time to put people ahead of owls").
312. See supra notes 13-15, 61-73 and accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., An Issue That Begs the Widsom of Owls, CHI. TRIB., May 20, 1992,
at 16, ("[The act's flaw is that it deals largely in absolutes and makes little allowance for
human needs."); Charles C. Mann & Mark L. Plummer, Dialogue: Showdown on Endan-
gered Species: The Noah Principle, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1992, at AI5 ("The battle over
the number of jobs threatened by the owl is irrelevant because the law doesn't care. One
job, 100,000 jobs-it doesn't matter. Any one owl still comes ahead of all human interests.")
314. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text. The Act's limited effectiveness
in preventing extinction reveals how far from absolute it is. See, e.g., Michael E. Soul6,
Conservation: Tactics for a Constant Crisis, 253 SCIENCE 744 (1991) (noting that the ESA
"has not significantly slowed the deterioration of the nation's biological estate"). As of
1987, 80 candidates for protection under the Act had been dropped because they had
become extinct. See Salzman, supra note 91, at 341 (citing ESA Reauthorization Hearings
Before House Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Comm., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 219 (1987)). The rate of extinctions in the United
States may now exceed the rate of listing of species under the ESA. David Blockstein,
Toward a Federal Plan for Biological Diversity, Issus IN Sci. & TECH. 63, 64 (Summer
1989).
315. Even the prohibition on takings by private actors is not absolute. The Act
provides exceptions for incidental takings with a permit and in cases of undue economic
hardship. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a), (b). Under FWS regulations, the agency may impose binding
conditions on incidental takings requiring "reasonable and prudent measures" by the actor.
50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g). However, consultation is purely voluntary, and the FWS lacks
authority under the ESA to take action to rectify another agency's wrongful refusal to
consult. For a thorough discussion of the limitations of the consultation process, see
generally Daugherty, supra note 95. But cf. Salzman, supra note 91, at 327-30 (suggesting
that ESA decisions establish basis for finding taking based on adverse modification).
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gional significance, if the benefits of such action outweigh the
benefits of preservation and the activity is in the public interest.
Moreover, even when these short-term economic concerns do not
overtly prevail, the protections of the Act are relatively modest.
Designation of critical habitat, while a tremendous boost to a
species' chances for survival, 316 is not a talisman that prevents
extinction.317 As currently interpreted and applied, the threshold
that economic activity must cross in order to be halted in critical
habitat may be high indeed. 31 8 Moreover, the process for desig-
nating critical habitat includes a cost-benefit analysis, making
ESA's protections far from absolute. 319
Critics of the ESA also argue that focusing scientific and legal
attention on a species as a surrogate for broader environmental
values is illegitimate. 320 This argument presumes that the ESA
serves a valid purpose only when it is enforced by those who care
solely about individual species. This argument fails in two ways:
(1) it is premised on a view of the ESA that is inconsistent with
the statute's premises and is ecologically unsound, and (2) it has
no basis in the American legal tradition.
The explicit purpose of the ESA is "to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved. 32' It makes no
sense to say that trying to effectuate one of the ESA's central
purposes represents an illegitimate use of the Act. The fundamen-
tal point of the science of ecology is that species, habitat, and the
ecosystem are an interconnected whole; protecting the part is only
316. As Professor Blumm has pointed out, without a critical habitat designation,
biological uncertainty makes determining the impact of particular timber sales on owl
survival especially difficult. Blumm, supra note 265, at 617; see generally Salzman, supra
note 91. The lack of designations for four-fifths of the listed species appears to be the
greatest limitation on the effectiveness of section 7. See id. at 330, 332-33.
317. See Yagerman, supra note 4, at 840-45.
318. Salzman, supra note 91, at 324-27, discusses the conflation of the "jeopardy"
and "adverse modification" standards in cases applying the ESA. While critical habitat may
simplify the required proof, the interpretation given to the term "adverse modification" is
critical. To the extent that courts revisit the biological question of the impact of modification
on the species' ultimate fate (i.e., the jeopardy issue) in assessing whether modification of
habitat is "adverse" within the meaning of section 7, critical habitat designation becomes
less and less meaningful. See also Eric Erdheim, The Wake oftthe Snail Darter: Insuring
the Effectiveness of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 9 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 629, 656
- 59 (1981) (describing issues involved in determination of adverse modification).
319. See supra notes 99-102.
320. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
321. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
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meaningful as one step in a plan to preserve the whole. Disquali-
fying those who also wish to preserve the ecosystem on which a
threatened species depends from championing that species' cause
would thus frustrate fundamental purposes of the ESA. 322
Even if ecosystem protection were not a stated goal of the
ESA, the argument that motive should disqualify citizens from
enforcing laws to achieve their broader goals radically departs from
the American legal tradition. We do not examine the underlying
motives of otherwise legitimate plaintiffs to make sure those mo-
tives are precisely coextensive with those of a statute before al-
lowing an action to proceed. 323
The true complaint of those viewing the owl and the ESA as
the problem is not that enforcement of the ESA is illegitimate,
unethical or uneconomical, or that the ESA is "absolutist", but
that the ESA sometimes operates effectively as a constraint on
certain types of economic activity. The simple basis for these
parties' opposition to the implementation, continued vitality, and
improvement of these laws is far from unique to the spotted owl
case: it is the desire to allow short-term profits from economic
activity to prevail over other values, whatever they may be. 324 Not
surprisingly, the strongest opposition to enforcing the laws in this
case came from those in the region who would be injured in the
short-term.
An alternative criticism of the ESA is a straightforward dis-
agreement with its purposes. One can fairly argue against the anti-
extinction policy of the ESA or the viability requirement of the
NFMA on their own terms by simply disagreeing with the values
322. Such a policy would also presumably require us to abandon the goal of pro-
tecting ecosystems on which endangered species depend, making the effort to preserve
species more difficult, costly, and even futile.
323. For example, we do not explore the motives of a trade association challenging
environmental regulations to see if their opposition is "illegitimately" driven by a desire
for higher profits rather than a concern for the technical soundness of the rule. A policy
demanding coextensive motives would restrict access to courtrooms far beyond the already
formidable limitations imposed by the doctrine of standing and Article III of the
Constitution.
324. See Salzman, supra note 91, at 322 n.52 (quoting Endangered Species Act:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environ-
ment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 159
(1982) (statement of Michael J. Bean) (noting that only species listed during first two years
of Reagan administration was invertebrate that lived solely in one meter of a spring on the
grounds of the National Zoo, "the listing of which will have little or no impact upon any
economic or commercial interest")).
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the statutes embody.325 Yet this disagreemeent with the statutes'
values does not explain the unique attack on protection of the
spotted owl. All economic activity that ignores ultimate ecological
constraints will sooner or later encounter some sort of "spotted
owl problem"; one of the only pecularities in the old-growth case
was the large number of people affected. 326
Blaming the ESA, public participation in planning, and the
owl for the old-growth conflict is a short-sighted response to a
subtle and enduring dilemma. The old-growth controversy was not
"caused" by concern for environmental values any more than it
was "caused" by the loggers cutting trees. The lesson of the spot-
ted owl conflict is not that the ESA is excessively painful and
should be abandoned. Rather, it is that the lack of a sound overall
approach will lead to future conflicts.
B. Beyond the "Spotted Owl Problem":
The Search for Root Causes
Although they fall short of providing a comprehensive envi-
ronmental policy,327 the NFMA, the FLPMA, the ESA, and NEPA
represent a serious commitment to natural resource values. 328 Na-
tional forest and BLM planners devote considerable resources
each year toward fashioning harvesting constraints while accom-
modating historically excluded ecological, esthetic, and ethical
325. Public opinion polls suggest that most Americans do not disagree with those
statutory values. See supra note 63. Recent polls consistently show that the public is
concerned with environmental protection and believes that the environment needs greater
protection, even at the cost of economic growth. See, e.g., ROPER ORGANIZATION, THE
ENVIRONMENT: PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR (July 1990) (69% of those
polled said we have not gone far enough in enacting laws and regulations to protect the
environment; 17% thought we have struck about the right balance; only 4% said we have
gone too far; 10% did not know). When asked about local industry being hurt by laws
protecting a rare bird, fish, plant or animal, 61% of those polled said their sympathies lay
with protecting the wildlife, 26% with protecting businesses or jobs, and 13% were not
sure. JOHN MARTILLA & TOM KILEY AND MARKET STRATEGIES, SURVEY OF AMERICAN
VOTERS: ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ENVIRONMENT (1990).
326. Also peculiar to the old-growth controversy was the industry's awareness that
its activity would soon confront environmental constraints, namely depletion of Pacific
Northwest old-growth forests. The only surprise was that obstacles arose before all of the
trees that .could be profitably logged were cut down. The pattern of harvesting old growth
was never intended to be "sustainable."
327. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Environmental Policy-It's Time for a New Begin-
ning, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 111, 116 (1989); David Schoenbrod, Environmental Law
and Growing Up, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 357 (1989).
328. See supra part III.A.
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values. But as long as environmental preservation remains a public
value, painful conflicts between economic activity and environ-
mental preservation will continue to exist.329
Dissatisfaction with the process for resolving the old-growth
controversy is inevitable. The debate arises in an area of law and
politics characterized by conflicting and deeply held values. Legal
process and administration can help remove the sting and messi-
ness of such conflicts ;330 however, in the spotted owl controversy,
the administrative framework enhanced rather than lessened strife.
This Section discusses inadequacies in the legal framework
that contributed to the costs of the old-growth controversy: (1) the
inability of the legal system to produce an effective response before
the impending extinction of a species reveals the inadequacy of
planning; (2) the exclusion of important values from consideration
by the legal process; (3) the disproportionate focus placed on a
single species, which needlessly jeopardized the owl's survival as
well as the forest's; (4) the limited integration of cost-benefit anal-
ysis and the failure to anticipate and respond to short-term eco-
nomic dislocation; and (5) the extensive use of appropriation riders
instead of the normal deliberative process purportedly required to
amend existing law.
1. The Costs of Crisis Management
The ESA and the NFMA viability regulation are enforceable
only as measures of last resort. The ESA affords a species protec-
tion when it faces extinction throughout all or a significant portion
of its range. Instead of requiring sound planning to prevent species
decline, the ESA halts activities only once a species is on the
verge of extinction. The Act thus is no substitute for effective first-
order preventive measures.
Theoretically, the NFMA viability regulation is a somewhat
more sophisticated planning tool than the ESA. Unfortunately, the
use of "viability" as a threshold and the limitations of scientific
knowledge diminish the efficacy of this planning process.3 31 Thus,
329. See, e.g. Wilkinson, supra note 66, at 409.
330. See id.
331. The failure of the viability standard to protect the owl before it was listed as
threatened supports this conclusion. But see WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 11, at
298-99 (suggesting that requirement that distribution of vertebrate species be maintained
provides strong mandate and early warning signal that should prevent species isolation and
consequent decline).
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like the ESA, the viability regulation operates as a tool of last
resort.
It makes little sense to make complex, long-range value
choices through a crisis management structure. 332 At the threshold
of extinction, the measures required to preserve a species are
drastic. 333 Effective intervention may require the interruption of
ongoing economic activity; in the case of the spotted owl, dramatic
logging cuts resulted. Advance* planning for the impending eco-
nomic transition would have greatly eased the difficult times many
individual loggers experienced. 3 4
Years of inadequate planning combined with an ecological fail-
safe have produced a policy that allows headlong pursuit of short-
term, profit-oriented economic activity while running afoul of long-
term economic and environmental values. The spotted owl case
provides an important example, not of the excesses of our resource
protection laws, but rather of their inability to assure even minimal
environmental protection efficiently in the public forests.
2. Exclusion of Relevant Factors of Decisions
A second problem with relying upon the ESA and the owl to
resolve the old-growth conflict is the limited range of analysis
under the Act. It provides no guarantee of effective preservation
of environmental values other than species protection. 35 Address-
ing the needs of the spotted owl, an indicator species for the old-
growth ecosystem, under the ESA produces very different out-
332. See Alston Chase, The Frontier Hits Its Limit, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Nov.
10, 1991, at 3 (ESA is effective in raising public consciousness but is poor tool for economic
and ecological planning). Even the efficacy of the ESA is open to question because of the
inadequate funding provided by Congress. Current efforts succeed in protecting only a
fraction of the number of species that are endangered. See generally U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: TYPES AND NUMBERS OF IMPLEMENT-
ING ACTIONS GAO/RCED-92-131BR (May 1992).
333. The cost of the measures that must be taken directly for a species are generally
significantly greater at the threshold of extinction than if intervention occurs earlier. See
Suzanne Winckler, Stopgap Measures, ATL. MONTHLY, Jan. 1992, at 74; Doremus, supra
note 4, at 316-17. A recent study also explains that 1 th-hour intervention under the ESA
is frequently too late for successful recovery. See Jon R. Luoma, Listing of Endangered
Species Said to Come Too Late to Help, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1993, at C4.
334. Cf. Lohr, Job Cuts by IBM May Rise, supra note 58 (noting IBM's longstanding
policy not to lay off workers, but to reduce workforce through yearly programs of early-
retirement packages).
335. Doremus, supra note 4, at 304-17, discusses the argument that the ESA does
not protect biodiversity or ecosystems because of its structure. But see supra note 322.
1993] Beyond the Spotted Owl 317
comes than would a policy directly addressing the sum of the old-
growth issues.336 In designating critical habitat under the ESA,
consideration of the needs of the owl necessarily comes first,337 to
the exclusion of the many other values that may be advanced by
preservation of old-growth forest.338
A look at the issues addressed in the NFMA and the ESA
litigation leads to the same conclusion. In the spotted owl cases,
most of the issues that were debated were quite narrow, and many
could be characterized as minor when considered in light of the
controversy as a whole.339
336. One outcome of emerging public concern for old-growth forests is pending
legislation that would provide protection for old growth independent of, and in addition to,
the protection afforded under ESA, see infra notes 373-376, recognizing the different
concerns that motivate forest protection and protection of the northern spotted owl.
The owl filled an important need for a concrete focus both for scientific study and
for legal attention, since studying the survival of a single species is a much simpler task
than trying to assess the health of an ecosystem.
337. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (defining critical habitat in part as "the specific areas
within the geographical area occupied by the species... on which are found those physical
or biological features.., essential to the conservation of the species"); CRITICAL HABITAT
FOR THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL, supra note 7, at 27-35 (describing criteria for identi-
fying critical habitat).
338. Ecosystem values did enter into the FWS's economic analysis in a limited way
under section 4(b)(2) of the ESA. In its economic analysis of the costs and benefits of
excluding an area from critical habitat, the FWS considered recreational, esthetic, biodi-
versity, and aquatic benefits provided by old-growth forests as part of the positive impacts
of designation. Determination of Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl, 57 Fed.
Reg. 1796, 1819-20 (1992) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17); see also ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,
supra note 241, at 68-81. In its full report on the critical habitat designation process for
the northern spotted owl, the FWS included a section entitled "Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Protection," CRITICAL HABITAT FOR THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL, supra note 7, Part
IV, exploring the benefits of protecting old-growth ecosystems separately from its discus-
sion of benefits to the owl. FWS discussed in detail the ecological reasons for preserving
old growth, noting that protection of owl habitat only incidentally and imperfectly achieved
this larger goal. Id. at 70. The section emphasized the need for more systematic consider-
ation of ecosystem and biodiversity protection to lessen the need for costly emergency
protection of individual species. Id. at 69-70.
339. For example, in Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash.
1988), the issues centered on whether or not the FWS was required to list and designate
critical habitat for the owl. See supra notes 206-212, 235-238 and accompanying text. In
the cases challenging timber sales, the courts ruled largely on issues of procedure or
statutory interpretation, see supra notes 154-179 and accompanying text, which failed to
address broader policy questions raised by the dispute. In contrast to these rulings of
narrow, more technical issues relating to the owl, legal procedure, and statutory interpre-
tation, the hearings held to determine whether to award injunctive relief to the plaintiffs in
the cases resulted in findings on a set of broader issues. In Seattle Audubon Society, Judge
Dwyer heard extensive evidence about the biological impact of logging on the owl and on
old-growth forests, the economic and social conditions for logging companies and mills and
their employees, and the agencies' past and recent actions under the relevant statutes raised
by plaintiffs. See 771 F. Supp. at 1088-95.
Perhaps in part because this hearing, held under the court's broad equitable authority,
was the only judicial or administrative forum in which these issues were fully aired during
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The narrow focus of the statutes also had an impact on public
perception of the laws and public confidence in them.3 4 Loggers
whose jobs were at stake and others affected by protection of the
owl repeatedly voiced outrage that their interests seemed to be
excluded from the legal process and that their well-being was
sacrificed for a mere owl. While not entirely true,341 their percep-
tion that the ESA sets up a very narrow equation that fails to
account for the full array of interests involved is accurate. Neither
did the NFMA, the FLPMA, or NEPA adequately address this
broader picture. 342
Moreover, the need to rely on endangered species as surro-
gates delays development or correction of policies and laws.
Agency action could only be halted in the old-growth controversy
when a sufficiently studied species was proven to be threatened
or endangered. Widespread awareness of the need for change in
Forest Service and BLM policies governing old-growth forests
significantly predated the point at which the owl's extinction be-
came likely. But effective intervention to correct agency abuses
had to wait for the imminent extinction of the owl.
3. The Owl's Burden
The obligatory reliance upon the owl as the impetus for pre-
serving old-growth forests placed a heavy burden on the threatened
species. Throughout the litigation and political debate, advocates
suggested that broad protective measures needed to be justified by
the value of the species, even though many other values had public
support and existing government policy favored old-growth
preservation.
The acreage needed for the spotted owl's habitat was un-
usually large.343 Asking for preservation of millions of acres of
the early stages of the dispute, Judge Dwyer's order generated great hostility to the role
of the courts.
340. For an interesting cross-cultural comparison, see J. F. Holleman, Disparities
and Uncertainties in African Law and Judicial Authority: A Rhodesian Case Study, 17
AR. L. STUD. 1, 6-9 (1979) (describing dissatisfaction of Rhodesians with European-
imposed appellate process for reviewing tribal court decisions because overly narrow field
of inquiry created public perception that justice was not being done.)
341. As discussed above, economic considerations entered into the critical habitat
determination as well as the exemption process. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying
text.
342. See supra part III.C.1.
343. See supra note 37.
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forest for one species of bird tested the limits of public support
for species protection. On the other hand, preservation of the owl
was one of the easiest cases to make before the national public,
due to the species' "cute furry creature" appeal.344 Lower order
creatures that may be as, or far more, ecologically significant, but
which lack this appeal, would face an even more tenuous and
difficult battle. 345 Forcing the loss of 30,000 timber industry jobs
to be justified in terms of the owl's protection is unnecessary,
since protections for old growth are being sought for many more
reasons than the owl's survival. Focusing on the species caused
all involved literally to lose sight of the forest for the trees.
Critics of species preservation ask how much it will "cost" to1
save a particular species, 346 forgetting what else is "bought" with
much of this money. Typically, vast tracts of land will be set aside
for habitat, thereby preserving them in a relatively undisturbed
state. A pronounced single-species focus marginalizes such
broader benefits that are derived from the preservation of a species
and its habitat.
4. Balancing Economic and Environmental Values
A fourth cause of the problems associated with the old-growth
controversy is the statutes' effort to balance economic and envi-
ronmental values. The various forms of cost-benefit analysis used
under the statute remain problematic. 347
The resolution of conflict between economic activity and nat-
ural resource protection involves a complex equation with many
components and possible solutions. 348 The ESA, like many envi-
344. This may have been an essential factor in the successful nationalization of the
controversy. See supra notes 272-279 and accompanying text (discussing public choice
theory).
345. See, e.g., Mann & Plummer, supra note 47, at 49-51.
346. See Bill Dietrich, Study: To Save Owl Would Cost Billions, SEATTLE TIMES,
Feb. 12, 1993, at C4 (estimate by University of Washington economist that home range of
3000 acres for each nesting pair of owls was worth $45 million). Roughly $800,000 was
spent in 1989 and 1990 to "save" the Higgins' eye pearly mussel. Suzanne Winckler, Stopgap
Measures, ATL. MONTHLY, Jan. 1992, at 77. $2.6 million was spent on land for the dusky
seaside sparrow, $9.2 million has been spent for the Bell's vireo, and $5.9 million for the
grizzly bear. Mann & Plummer, supra note 47, at 56, 59.
347. On the role of cost-benefit analysis under the NFMA, see generally Dennis E.
Teeguarden, Benefit-Cost Analysis in National Forest System Planning: Policy, Uses and
Limitations, 17 ENVTL. L. 393 (1987).
348. On the dangers of cost-benefit analysis, see William H. Rodgers, Benefits, Costs,
and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVrL. L.
REv. 191, 198 (1980).
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ronmental statutes, requires the weighing of relevant economic
costs against the environmental benefits of protection, to deter-
mine the proper level of protection to provide. 49 However, the
statute's broad language leaves difficult, unguided value choices
to the FWS. 350
For example, the agency must decide whether to exclude area
from critical habitat because "the benefits of such exclusion out-
weigh the benefits of specifying such area as part of the critical
habitat." 351 The statute does not define the types of "benefits" that
are relevant, nor does it suggest how heavily short-term economic
benefits should weigh against the advantages to a species of ad-
ditional habitat. 352
Similarly, the exemption provision, under which the Endan-
gered Species Committee can overrule the anti-extinction provi-
sions, states that exemptions are to be granted only where the
benefits of the proposed action "clearly outweigh the benefits of
alternative courses of action consistent with conserving the species
or its critical habitat. '35 3 The scale on which the benefits are to be
measured is one of competing values. Economists cannot tell us,
though, what constitutes a benefit or which benefits are more
significant, except to the degree that they are a function of market
demand. 354
The ESA purports to place a value on species preservation,
but it does not address the difficult question of when and why
economic activity that will lead to a species' extinction would ever
be preferable to, or "outweigh," restraint and preservation of the
species. 355 Moreover, it does not suggest any standards for deter-
349. See infra notes 351-359 and accompanying text.
350. See Stevens, supra note 54, at C8.
351. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
352. Cf. Teeguarden, supra note 347, at 415-18 (discussing issues surrounding selec-
tion of discount rate for forest management planning under NFMA). The statutes do not
purport to resolve these questions or to adopt any particular approach, markedly increasing
agency discretion.
353. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(ii).
354. See W. Michael Hanemann, Economics and the Preservation of Biodiversity,
in BIODIVEPSlITY, supra note 4, at 193-98, on the shortcomings of an economic basis for
valuing biodiversity. See also David Ehrenfeld, Why Put a Value on Biodiversity, in
BIODIVEPSITY, supra note 4, at 212-16.
355. For discussion of the similar problems resulting from the broad delegations by
Congress in the Clean Air Act, see Schoenbrod, supra note 327, at 361-67.
One of the pending bills to amend the ESA would exacerbate the uncertainty that
characterizes the current ESA. See Environment and Economic Stability Act of 1992, H.R.
5105, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The bill requires that a broad analysis of all direct and
indirect costs and benefits of listing be done before listing a species under the ESA. It
provides little guidance on how the agency should resolve the problems that render such
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mining why the preservation of some species might be more im-
portant than that of others.3 56 Yet, in some undefined class of
cases, it allows competing values to prevail over species protec-
tion.3 57 Leaving such difficult value choices to the agency's un-
guided discretion assures that implementation of the law will be
contentious. 358 If cost-benefit analysis is to play an important role
in our resource protection laws, then resource protection laws
must provide a mechanism for coherently balancing the full range
of long-term economic and environmental values against the im-
mediate costs involved.359
Others have criticized the integration of economics into the
NFMA.360 Although not explicitly at issue in the old-growth liti-
gation, NFMA economics were at the heart of the larger debate. 361
No challenges were or could have been brought to the economic
analyses that supported old-growth harvesting because the com-
plexity of the relevant decisions and the broad discretion given
the agency effectively insulates these decisions from review.3 62
an analysis both malleable and difficult. The analysis seems intended to influence only
critical habitat determinations and exemption and listing decisions. Id.
356. Of course, choices among species must be made even outside of the exemption
process in the routine implementation of the Act, given the very limited funding available
and the costly task of rescuing species on the brink. See Mann & Plummer, supra note 47,
at 55-56 (describing FWS's efforts to develop system of priorities and its perverse effects
upon the attempt to save dusky seaside sparrow). The inevitability of value choices high-
lights the importance of the challenge to better define the ethical basis for our resource
protection laws. See infra notes 376-384 and accompanying text.
357. Many commentators take comfort in the fact that thus far, the exemption process
has been used only three times. See, e.g., des Rosiers, supra note 103, passim (arguing
that current exemption process is rigorous and effective without weakening the ESA). But
there is no certainty that its use will not become more common with time.
358. See supra note 330.
359. See Hanemann, supra note 354, for a discussion of some of the economic issues
that need to be resolved before a sound cost-benefit analysis for natural resource depletion
can be developed.
360. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 125-28; Wilkinson, supra note
27, at n.101 and accompanying text; O'TOOLE, supra note 27.
361. See supra notes 16-31 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text. O'TooLE, supra note 27,
analyzes in detail and criticizes many of the assumptions supporting Forest Service eco-
nomic analyses, revealing their complexity. But see F. Kaid Benflield, The Administrative
Record and the Range of Alternatives in National Forest Planning: Applicable Standards
and Inconsistent Approaches, 17 ENVTL. L. 371, 377, 383-84 (1987) (noting vulnerability
of Forest Service economic analysis relying on unsupported assumption that recreational
value of forest would increase with increased logging due to greater access provided by
logging roads).
The following letter, sent to the Siskiyou National Forest supervisor and the Oregon
congressional delegation in January 1988 by a state resident, highlights the flaws in the
vision of economics that supported the pattern of old-growth harvesting.
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Forest planners must increasingly face long-range economic
considerations in environmental protection decisions as finite nat-
Enclosed please find a shaving of Port Orford cedar I cut with a block plane.
In my work as a musical instrument maker and builder of timber-frame struc-
tures, white cedar has come to be my favorite wood.
I have studied with Italian and Japanese master woodworkers and ap-
preciate their traditions of excellence. So I cannot begrudge the Japanese for
stockpiling Port Orford cedar because they probably make very good use of
most of it. They certainly have no incentive to harvest their own white cedar
trees when they can buy ours for a pittance. We are now charging about $30001
mbf for clear old-growth logs which are worth approximately $60,000/mbf in
Japan. They are scoffing at us. Due to its workability, rot-resistance and
stability, this wood has an inherent value which far exceeds administrative
costs for its sale and transportation out of the forest and into the holds of ships.
Yet for me, the best quality logs are almost unobtainable; I have to choose
from "export rejects."
To close, I respectfully request that you set aside some significant per-
centage of our Port Orford cedar, yew, and spruce forest ... and fir ... to be
selectively harvested for sustained yield of old-growth wood so that American
craftsmen and our descendants will have the opportunity to create noble, useful
objects for the general good of the people with this gift that nature has bestowed
on us.
Sincerely yours,
Rob Chambers
Letter from Rob Chambers, Oregon resident, to Bob Packwood, U.S. Senate (Jan.
20, 1988).
Several members of the Pacific Northwest congressional delegation sent the following
responses to Mr. Chambers's letter:
Dear Mr. Chambers:
Thank you for your correspondence regarding the Forest Plan for the
Siskiyou National Forest as it affects resource values. I appreciate having the
benefit of your comments.
As you know, the Forest Service has released a series of alternative
management proposals for the forest and asked the public to comment on these
alternatives. It is important that local users of the forest with a firsthand
knowledge of the resources become involved in these planning efforts.
Sincerely,
Bob Packwood
[U.S. Senator]
Letter from Bob Packwood, U.S. Senate, to Rob Chambers, Oregon resident (Feb.
10, 1988).
Dear Mr. Chambers:
Thank you for providing me with your comments on the Siskiyou Na-
tional Forest Plan.
Your participation in the planning process will help decide the fate of
the national forests, the economy, and the quality of life in Oregon. The
National Forest Management Act of 1976, which created this planning process,
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ural reserves begin to be depleted. The spotted owl controversy
is the first highly visible case in which the continuation of region-
ally important economic activity threatens rapid depletion of multi-
valued natural resources. Clarification of the structure for resolv-
ing such conflicts may enable us to reach better and more widely
accepted decisions in the future.3 63
Another problem that arises from the integration of economics
into resource protection laws is that the current laws set up a false
dichotomy between certain types of economic activity and envi-
ronmental protection. Because of this structure, the legal system
fails to provide an adequate response to the short-term economic
dislocation environmental protection creates.
Under the provisions of the NFMA and the ESA, economics
are relevant only to qualify or vitiate the protections afforded by
the statute.3 64 Congress has provided no significant authority to
mitigate the short-term human and economic costs of environmen-
tal protection.3 65 The only way to obtain relief under the statutes
has at its center an excellent opportunity for local people to decide the uses
and management practices of individual forests.
Sincerely,
Les AuCoin
Member of Congress
Letter from Les AuCoin, U.S. House of Representatives, to Rob Chambers, Oregon
resident (Feb. 5, 1988).
It is ironic that these legislators urged participation in the planning process during
the very year they adopted the FY 1988 rider, which dramatically narrowed the opportu-
nities for meaningful challenges to Forest Service decisions and would likely have precluded
Mr. Chambers' challenge. See supra note 182-186 and accompanying text..
363. See Teeguarden, supra note 347, at 404-07, 411-15 (noting problems of inade-
quate empirical evidence on benefits of some forest outputs and unspecified weight to be
given economic efficiency under NFMA).
364. For example, even though section 7 of the ESA directs that all efforts be made
to resolve the confficting values, see 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(i) (requiring Committee to
find that "there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action"), the
agency has little positive authority to do more than two things: favor protection of the
species (and thereby restrain economic activity) or decline to protect the species completely
(and allow economic activity to override protection). But see 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(B)
(requiring Committee to establish "reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures ...
as are necessary and appropriate to minimize the adverse effects of the agency action").
365. Wilkinson, supra note 27, at 405, describes the need for an ethic that "mani-
fest[s] itself in a dogged determination of the society-at-large to treat the environment and
its people as equals, to recognize both as sacred, and to insure that all members of the
community not only search for, but insist upon, solutions that fulfill the ethic." The current
structure for integrating economic and environmental considerations seems to prevent such
a pursuit, presenting instead a bipolar choice.
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is if the agency decides to minimize environmental protection in
order to avoid the short-term hardship. Worker retraining, relo-
cation assistance, incentives for alternative economic develop-
ment, and other temporary regional aid are examples of positive
measures that should be at least promoted, if not prescribed, when
mandated resource protection would unfairly impose heavy short-
term costs on a segment of the population.366
In the spotted owl controversy, Congress has responded in an
ad hoc manner to job losses, worker retraining needs, and regional
economic problems.3 67 What is needed is systematic planning, un-
der a policy that affords well-defined resource protection, pro-
motes economic adaptation, and provides assistance in cases of
economic dislocation. The spotted owl controversy highlights the
degree to which our laws force an artificial confrontation between
two choices when, in reality, all parties ultimately must face both
the environmental and economic consequences of the chosen
resolution.
5. Distortion of the Political and Judicial Process
The foregoing discussion of inadequacies in our laws assumes
full enforcement of NEPA, the NFMA and the FLPMA. When
Congress intervenes to limit the opportunity for challenges to
agency discretion, as it did from 1988 through 1990, an even more
predictable disaster results. Riders short-cut the policymaking pro-
cess and substitute horse-trading for reasoned evaluation of natural
366. For examples of Congress's past use of such provisions, see Title XI of the
Clean Air Amendments of 1990, P.L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7407)
(providing short-term economic assistance to workers displaced as a result of the sulfur
dioxide emission reduction provisions); Title II of the Redwood National Park Expansion
Act of 1978, P.L. 95-250, 92 Stat. 172, 201-13 (providing laid-off timber workers up to six
years of compensation and retraining).
367. See Endangered Species Employment Transition Assistance Act, S. 2491, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (authorizing grants for training dislocated workers, training adjust-
ment assistance, and employment services); Forest and Community Survival Act, H.R.
2807, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991); Northwest Forest Protection and Community Stability
Act, H.R. 3263, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991); Pacific Northwest Forest Community Re-
covery and Ecosystem Conservation Act, H.R. 3432 and S. 1536, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); Timber Resource Employment and Enhancement Act, H.R. 3931, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991) (creating program to "restore and enhance federal forest lands, giving prefer-
ence to contractors from local rural communities and those who employ persons in rural
communities in implementing program").
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resource conflicts. 368 In the case of the owl, the riders increased
the bias in agency decisionmaking processes towards timber pro-
duction,369 ostensibly to protect timber-dependent communities.
However, the higher harvest levels only assured that the restric-
tions needed to protect the owl would be more extensive and thus
more "costly."
The riders have increased the pressure on the ESA by weak-
ening other protective laws. More generally, resort to the riders
facilitated a hasty reaction to one facet of a complex controversy.
Such legislation is the antithesis of reasoned integration of eco-
nomic and ecological values. Moreover, if one accepts the expla-
nation of the riders afforded by public choice theory,3 70 use of the
riders as a vehicle for policy and law development is especially
troubling, given the apparent divergence between concentrated
regional economic interest and the broader national interest on
public land and ecological issues.371
V. THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
A number of problems inhere in the structure of the laws
employed in the old-growth controversy. Assuming the correctness
of this characterization, 372 several responses suggest themselves.
One clear answer is to enact better laws. There have been
many recent calls for statutory protection of biodiversity and
ecosystems 373 as well as legislative proposals aimed at preservation
of forests, 374 ecosystems, 375 ecosystem diversity, and biodiver-
368. See supra notes 180-205; Sher & Hunting, supra note 180, at 476-85 (suggesting
need for heightened judicial scrutiny of riders); Bolduan, supra note 180, at 375-80 (dis-
cussing shortcomings of riders as policymaking vehicle).
369. See Bolduan, supra note 180, at 377.
370. See supra notes 272-279 and accompanying text.
371. The characterization of these interests as divergent seems to be confirmed by
the history of Congress's subsequent repudiation of the riders. See supra note 205.
372. See supra part IV.
373. Smith, supra note 91; Reed F. Noss, A Native Ecosystems Act, 1 WILD EARTH
24 (Spring 1991).
374. See H.R. 4899, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); H.R. 1590, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991) (creating old-growth forest reserve system and requiring designation of about
6 million acres as part of system); Ancient Forest Protection Act, H.R. 842, 102d Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1991); Forest Community Survival Act, H.R. 2807, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
(developing old-growth reserve system).
375. See Forest Biodiversity and Clearcutting Prohibition Act, H.R. 1969, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) & S. 3228, 102d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1992); H.R. 4045, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1992) (reauthorizing ESA and giving priority to integrated multispecies recovery
plans).
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sity.376 However, the inadequacies of our current laws may reflect
an obstacle more basic than a failure to recognize the problem or
a lack of political will. The relatively few statutes with enforceable
commands may reflect the human tendency to avoid confronting
the difficult questions raised by situations such as the old-growth
controversy.
There has been little meaningfui public debate about how to
resolve these conflicts. 377 Before addressing the hard question of
how to protect more of the environment, it is necessary to consider
the more difficult and essential question of why we should protect
the environment. 378 Legislators have only glibly and incompletely
addressed this question and scholars have only recently seriously
studied it.379 Many statutes are premised on goals or ethics that
have been repudiated in practice or dismissed as naive.380 Unfor-
376. National Biological Diversity Conservation and Environmental Research Act,
H.R. 585, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See also William M. Flevares, Protecting Biological
Diversity at Home and Abroad, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2039, 2052-64 (1992) (analyzing
provisions of this bill).
377. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, BEAUTY, HEALTH AND PERMANENCE: ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1985 10 (1987) ("Environmental affairs have pro-
voked much action but little focused reflection."). This lack of reflection is not surprising
given the rapidity with which knowledge and concern about environmental protection have
developed in America. Virtually all of our strong environmental laws have been developed
since 1970.
378. Reitze, supra note 327, at 119-21, notes the lack of any "overall environmental
plan or goal" and suggests that we need to develop a long range consideration of priorities,
costs, and benefits.
379. Within philosophy departments, specialists in environmental ethics have strug-
gled for recognition and respectability. Journals such as Environmental Ethics, devoted
exclusively to the topic, are now well established. Recent works in the field include: J.
BAIRD CALLICOTT, IN DEFENSE OF THE LAND ETHIC: ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PHI-
LOSOPHY (1989); EUGENE C. HARGROVE, FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
(1989); HOLMES ROLSTON III, PHILOSOPHY GONE WILD: ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL
ETHICS (1986); PAUL W. TAYLOR, RESPECT FOR NATURE: A THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ETHICS (1986). Until quite recently, Christopher Stone and Edith Brown Weiss were among
the few scholars of environmental law to discuss environmental ethics outside of an oc-
casional mention of Aldo Leopold and a land ethic. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, EARTH
AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL PLURALISM (1987); Christopher D. Stone,
Should Trees Have Standing?-Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 450 (1972); Edith B. Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational
Equity, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495 (1984); more recently, see Richard Delgado, Our Better
Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax's Public Trust Theory of Environmental Pro-
tection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV.
1209 (1991); Meyers, supra note 13; Wilkinson, supra note 27.
380. For example, the stated goal of the Clean Water Act remains that "the discharge
of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)
(1988). NEPA professes that it is the policy of the government "to use all practicable means
... to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony" and recognizes "that each person should enjoy a healthful environment." 42
U.S.C. 101(a) & (c). Although the ESA states that conservation of species is its goal, 16
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tunately, the rhetoric of public debates over environmental issues
has not moved beyond these unexamined premises.3 81
There has been little open debate about how to resolve im-
minent and existing conflicts between short-term economic inter-
ests and long-term ecological preservation. The debate that has
occurred about harnessing economic incentives or market forces
to achieve environmental protection has focused more on tech-
niques for implementing environmental policies than on the un-
derlying question of what values those policies represent. 382
The claim that economics and environmental protection are
consistent depends upon the definitions of "economics" and "en-
vironmental protection. '383 To the extent that we rely on market
economics in determining levels of protection, severe problems of
valuation remain. Articulating public values in this field represents
a difficult challenge. 384 However, the task must be faced before
the natural resources that embody these values are irretrievably
altered. With this caveat in mind, the following are some general
strategies for legislative change that would address the statutory
shortcomings described in Part IV of this Article.
A. Eliminating Surrogacy: Ecosystem and
Biodiversity Protection
One strategy for reforming laws to avoid reliance on species
as surrogates for a more comprehensive set of environmental val-
ues is to identify those larger values and afford them protection
analogous to that provided species by the ESA. Many conservation
biologists, including Michael Soul6, have supported this strat-
U.S.C. 1531(b), its inadequate funding has assured that species become extinct notwith-
standing its provisions. See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17
ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990), for one perspective on this phenomenon.
381. See Mr. Bush's Political Environment, N.Y. TIMEs, May 19, 1992, at A22.
382. See Michael C. Blumm, The Fallacies of Free Market Environmentalism, 15
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 371, 389 (1992).
383. See Mathews, supra note 45.
384. See Holmes Rolston III, Property Rights and Endangered Species, 61 U. COLO.
L. REv. 283 (1990) (noting deeper thinking about the ESA's ethic may advance our under-
standing of relationship between law and ethics in this area).
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egy.3 85 Legislators have recently introduced a number of proposals
to provide ecosystem protection or to protect biodiversity com-
prehensively, reflecting a growing awareness of the inadequacy of
a strategy that focuses largely on individual species.38 6 Secretary
of the Interior Bruce Babbitt has announced plans to follow an
ecosystem approach to species protection. 87
Preservation of ecosystems or biodiversity would eliminate
the damaging effects associated with species surrogacy, would
promote policies that rationally achieve the goal of protecting
natural areas and systems, and could enhance public awareness of
the interdependence of resources in a positive and productive
way.388 Such legislation may also avoid the problem of crisis man-
agement approaches. One difficulty will be agreeing upon the ap-
propriate definition of an ecosystem or upon what sort of biodi-
versity merits protection. However, the existence of this challenge
does not warrant abandoning efforts to develop such laws.
385. Soul6 notes:
Progress in conservation is hampered by the lack of a clearly articulated public
policy on biodiversity. The United States and many other countries lack a
coherent conservation strategy .... In addition, a high level review of federal
agencies is necessary so that either the authority for the protection of biodi-
versity is vested in a new agency with clear directives, or the organic acts (if
any) of the agencies should be restiuctured, making conservation a prime
directive of the U.S. Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and
the National Wildlife Reserve System.
Soul6, supra note 314, at 749. See also Blockstein, supra note 314, at 64. See generally
BIODIVEnSITY, supra note 4. Others have called for more radical measures in order to
preserve biodiversity. See Paul R. Ehrlich & Edward 0. Wilson, Biodiversity Studies:
Science and Policy, 253 SCIENCE 758,761 (1991) (calling for halt to development of relatively
undisturbed land).
386. See supra notes 374-375. For an early suggestion of such an approach to
envirorimental protection, see Smith, supra note 96, at 395, 402. If we develop a policy of
biodiversity protection in some broader form, complex scientific issues and value choices
remain to be resolved. For example, phylogenetics and biogeography question the merits
of focusing on preserving endemic species, which occur in only one location, as opposed
to preservation of organisms that have demonstrated radiation, or the ability to evolve into
a more broad and widespread lineage through time. See Terry L. Erwin, An Evolutionary
Basis for Conservation Strategies, 253 SCIENcE 750, 751-52 (1991). Choosing between
types of species will require both scientific analysis and judgement on the values sought
by conservation. See id. at 751.
387. William K. Stevens, Interior Secretary Is Pushing a New Way to Save Species,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 17, 1993, at Al. To support this effort, Secretary Babbitt plans to conduct
a national biological survey that will allow better planning in advance of "collisions" like
the old-growth controversy. William K. Stevens, Babbitt to Map Ecosystems Under New
Policy to Save Them, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 14, 1993, at A29.
388. For a summary of the arguments for preservation of biodiversity and a look at
the question of how much we ought to preserve, see Doremus, supra note 4, at 269-86.
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B. Protection of Keystone and Indicator Species
A narrower endeavor would accord indicator or keystone spe-
cies special protection under the ESA.389 This approach would
recognize the ecological significance of certain species like the
owl, and would accord these species higher priority or earlier
protection. A statutory mandate recognizing and valuing the role
of these species as surrogates, would alleviate the focus on these
species as the only value at stake when ecosystem protection is
also at risk. If protection were triggered at some point before the
threshold of endangerment, conflicts might not suffer from the
problems of crisis management described in Part IV.A. 1. However,
identification of that earlier threshold will pose a difficult and
contentious scientific and political challenge, especially since
knowledge of keystone and indicator species and the roles they
play is incomplete, though evolving. Scientists currently may not
be able to identify keystone or indicator species until the species
are threatened.
C. Fulfilling NEPA'S Promise
Another possible direction to follow is to infuse NEPA with
a substantive mandate reflecting values inadequately protected
under our current laws and policies, such as ecosystem or biodi-
versity protection. Many have unsuccessfully advocated giving
NEPA teeth,390 but perhaps the owl controversy can provide a
new and persuasive reason to consider this possibility.391
D. Comprehensive Review and Reform
Most ambitious and difficult of all, we could undertake sys-
tematic revision of all our existing laws governing management of
389. See e.g., Smith, supra note 91, at 403-05 (suggesting prioritizing species based
on ecological functions or indicator status).
390. See, e.g., Philip M. Ferester, Revitalizing the National Environmental Policy
Act: Substantive Law Adaptations from NEPA's Progeny, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 207,
225-69 (1992).
391. A related strategy currently being pursued by NEPA's author, Lynton Caldwell,
along with others, is the development of a constitutional environmental provision to bolster
existing statutes. See Lynton Caldwell, An Environmental Amendment to the Constitution,
ENVTL. AMENDMENT CIRCULAR No. 4, June 1991, at 12-16.
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public lands. Such revision should account for values currently
lacking statutory protection.392 Based on some clearer understand-
ing of existing environmental policies, one could identify through
the history of their implementation statutes that lack a sufficiently
clear or sufficiently broad mandate.
E. Defining and Integrating Economics
All of the foregoing proposals address the inadequacy of cur-
rent statutes in incorporating environmental values into natural
resource planning. In addition to this weakness, the uncertain role
of economics in statutes and the dichotomy that characterizes
many legal standards pose fundamental problems. Achieving
greater clarity about what is meant by economic and environmental
values 393 would help those seeking to resolve disputes and would
eliminate avoidable misinterpretation and distortion. But most im-
portantly, statutes must integrate economic problem-solving into
environmental protection, rather than posing a bipolar choice be-
tween preserving the economy and protecting natural resources.
As finite resources are depleted, the United States will require
better and more systematic ways to respond to economic transi-
tion. Economics should be integrated by providing authority to
respond effectively to unavoidable hardships associated with nec-
essary environmental protection.
F. Developing Comprehensive Environmental Policy
Finally, in the search for root causes, one must look deeper
than the laws, policies, and markets that lead to conflicts among
competing values. Population is a root cause of many conflicts
392. Interagency initiatives designed to identify and correct deficiencies in existing
protections could help identify these unprotected values. See Blockstein, supra note 314,
at 65-66. See also Meyers, supra note 13, at 660-61 (suggesting need for integrated review
of existing environmental laws).
393. Initiatives such as the Society of Ecological Economics may represent a begin-
ning of efforts to address these problems. See Harold J. Morowitz, Balancing Species
Preservation and Economic Considerations, 253 SCIENCE 752, 754 (1991) (suggesting that
a National Institutes for the Environment would provide forum for inter-disciplinary dis-
cussion that will be needed to address these issues).
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between resource use and resource protection.3 94 Enhanced energy
efficiency promises to play a part in the overall solutions of many
resource conflicts. It would be wise to consider and respond to
the connections between fundamental issues like population and
resource preservation sooner rather than later.
G. Preserving the Democratic Process
The history of the extensive use of riders to set harvest levels
in the national forests and to amend existing environmental laws
suggests a disturbing pattern of subversion of the deliberative
process. Although the Supreme Court upheld the 1990 rider against
a separation of powers challenge, such riders may still violate
congressional rules395 and may ill serve the public. Especially in
light of the intense local economic interest in management of public
lands, required congressional process in the management of these
lands takes on particular importance and should be observed. 396
VI. CONCLUSION
The controversy over the spotted owl showed the current
statutory structures to be an inefficient and risky avenue for re-
solving the question of a single species' fate. The ESA procedures,
while an important tool for preserving endangered species, proved
unsatisfactory for resolving larger questions such as those involved
in public management of old-growth forests. As a result, some
have blamed the ESA itself for all the costs associated with re-
solving the old-growth controversy.
The ESA is not the problem its detractors claim it to be. On
the contrary, promotion of economic activities inconsistent with
popular ecological values in the absence of effective laws address-
ing conservation of land and natural resources represents the real
problem. The challenge at hand is to adapt the law and economic
policy to the reality of the ecological constraints that we recognize
394. See Reitze, supra note 327, at 116-17; Soul6 supra note 314, at 745-46 (listing
population as one of the seven sources of biotic degradation). See also Daniel E. Koshland,
Preserving Biodiversity, 253 SCIENCE 717 (1991); Morowitz, supra note 393, at 753.
395. See Blumm, supra note 203, at 52-53.
396. See Sher & Hunting, supra note 180 (suggesting need for heightened judicial
scrutiny of riders).
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as important. To ignore the lessons taught by the repeated extinc-
tion of species and the costs of last-minute efforts to prevent
extinction is to forego a crucial opportunity to amend laws and
economics that currently promise an unending series of "spotted
owl problems" throughout the country.
More and better laws alone cannot resolve this problem, how-
ever, since these gaps in protection partly reflect a struggle to find
an agreeable environmental ethic on which to build policy. Only
with a clearer ethical vision of appropriate preservation goals can
better laws be shaped. Our habit of mistaking the effects of the
environmental crisis for its causes is no longer legally, politically,
or ethically tenable.
